Table of Contents:

1. U.S. Radiation Data: Dietary Intake
A. Anthropogenic Radioactivity in Domestic Foods
B. Anthropogenic Radioactivity in Imported Foods
2. Baseline Data: Riso National Laboratory
3. Body Burdens
4. Chernobyl Peak Pulse in U.S.A. Imported Foods

RAD 9 of this website reviews the impact of weapons tests fallout on the dietary intake of artificial radionuclides of residents of the United States and Denmark for the purpose of providing an additional baseline for interpreting the impact of the Chernobyl accident. As a result of the many nuclear weapons detonations which began in 1950 and reached their peak in 1962 and which included large thermonuclear hydrogen bomb tests, world wide contamination from stratospheric fallout became an object of widespread concern and resulted in a variety of studies of the dietary intake of key fallout nuclides such as strontium 90 and cesium 137. This section summarizes a number of dietary intake studies, including Radiological Health and Data Reports, which became the U.S. Radiation Data Reports in the early 1970's. The second part of this section cites some of the extensive research done by the Riso National Laboratory in Denmark, followed by selected data pertaining to body burdens (radiocesium, etc.), and, finally, the infamous USFDA survey of imported foods that documented a strong pulse of Chernobyl derived radiocesium, and was withheld from public circulation. The 1994 summary of radionuclides in domestic and imported foods, 1987-1992, annotated below (see Cunningham, 1994) contained the first announcement that 40% of targeted imported food samples were contaminated with Chernobyl derived radiocesium.

The public health service initiated its institutional diet sampling program in 1961. The Atomic Energy Commission had already issued summaries of environmental radioactivity data for twenty two AEC installations in Radiological Health Data, beginning in November, 1960. This publication was a response to wide-spread public concern about elevated levels of weapons test derived radioactive contamination of the food supply. The high levels of contamination documented between 1957 and 1964 in the following reports were not reached again until the advent of Chernobyl derived contamination, the effect of which was felt primarily in foreign food supplies and had a minimal impact on domestic food production in the United States. Monitoring was discontinued in 1969 with the suspension of above ground weapons testing but was begun again in 1973 due to concerns about contamination from other sources. The publication of Radiation Data Reports was discontinued in 1976, with a more cursory and less detailed survey continued in the EPA publication Environmental Radiation Data which is still published and cited in several locations in this website (See RAD 10, U.S.A.) The following is a selection of diet surveys in order of their date of publication.

RADNET apologizes for the incomplete bibliographic citations which follow.

United States Atomic Energy Commission. Radiological Health Data. (October 1963). Volume number unavailable. pg. 562.
 

1957	Unknown	Milk	131I	990 pCi/l yearly mean
1957	Unknown	Milk	140Ba	530 pCi/l yearly mean
1959	St. Louis	Milk	137Cs	75 pCi/l yearly mean
1959	Atlanta	Milk	137Cs	68 pCi/l yearly mean
1961	Unknown	Milk	137Cs	25 pCi/l yearly mean
Nov-Dec 1961	St. Louis	Milk	137Cs	+80 pCi/l yearly mean
Nov-Dec 1961	St. Louis	Milk	90Sr	33.3 pCi/l yearly mean
1962	Unknown	Raw milk	137Cs	180 pCi/l yearly mean
1962	Unknown	Raw milk	90Sr	45.6 pCi/l yearly mean
1962	Unknown	Raw milk	89Sr	335 pCi/l yearly mean
1962	Unknown	Raw milk	140Ba	165 pCi/l yearly mean
1962	Unknown	Raw milk	131I	535 pCi/l yearly mean

• Nuclear weapons testing was briefly discontinued in 1959-1960, with only three tests compared to 172 tests the previous four years. Tests were resumed with much larger weapons in 1961-1962, when the test ban treaty was implemented.
• Maximum fallout levels from the 1961-62 tests were reached throughout the hemisphere between 1962 and early 1965, as illustrated by both the Public Health Service diet studies and the Riso National Laboratory (Denmark) Cumulative Fallout Summary reprinted in RAD 8: Baseline Data.

• For 76 samples, the average concentration was usually well below 10 pCi/kg. For 83 strontium-90 samples, the highest average was 16 pCi/kg, also in Tacoma, but most averages were below 10 pCi/kg.

• This survey represents averages of the daily intake of radiocesium at a large number of institutions throughout the United States. The USFDA used these averages throughout the 1960's for assessing the impact of weapons test fallout. (p. 454).
• The peak average of 2,320 pCi/day (85.9 Bq/day) equals an annual dietary intake of 31,353 Bq; the average is almost an order of magnitude less.
• This peak value represents the maximum level of weapons testing contamination of the diet by this radionuclide (¹³⁷Cs) noted by the editor of RADNET in these reports.

• Most of the FDA surveys show the highest concentrations of fallout contamination in the eastern part of the United States; these elevated concentrations probably correlate with rainfall activity.
• The FDA reports also show frequently elevated levels of radiocesium in Southeast Florida for reasons which are not explained.

• Resumption of U.S.S.R. tests began in early September, 1961, followed several weeks later by the resumption of U.S. testing. The institutional diet surveys show a sharp rise of ¹³¹I intake to approximately 60 pCi/day in late September; this level of activity continued erratically (20-60 pCi/day) through the fall of 1963, when this reporting period terminates.
• Radiocesium levels had continued at moderately high levels during the weapons testing interruption and then rose gradually in 1962 to levels exceeding 150 pCi/day (mean range) and higher by late 1963.
• Strontium-89 activity levels followed approximately the same path as ¹³¹I; strontium-90 levels followed the same intake pattern as cesium-137. See Figure Two, p.134.

• During this period of extensive contamination of the food supply, average radiocesium concentrations in milk were running in the 100-250 pCi/l range for most U.S. cities with the highest levels of contamination in the Northeast U.S. Average concentrations of strontium-90 were frequently in the 25-40 pCi range. The highest strontium-89 average was also Little Rock, Ark. at 200 pCi/l.
• The survey of pasteurized milk for Oct. 1963 shows continuing high levels of contamination in milk with a peak quarterly average of 355 pCi/l in Manchester, NH. Average radioactivity concentrations continued at the same high levels as earlier in the year.

United States Atomic Energy Commission. (January 1965). Radiological Health Data. pg. 33-36.

• The institutional daily dietary intake (based on a composite 7 consecutive day sample in each month) shows radiocesium intake continuing at high levels with peak values up to 440 pCi/day in Columbia, MO in April 1964, continuing high levels in the Northeast and monthly nationwide averages of 165-200 pCi/day in April-June of 1964. Strontium-90 contamination continued with monthly averages near 40 pCi/day.

• This report summarizes the average daily ¹³⁷Cs intake in twenty-three cities in February of 1963 to June of 1964 as follows:

• Nuclear detonations in Russia were terminated in 1962, but U.S. test explosions continued during 1963, at least according to Figure Two in the RHD Report of March 1964 cited above (Aarkrog in "Source Terms and Inventories of Anthropogenic Radionuclides," cited in RAD 11, lists zero atmospheric nuclear explosions in 1963). The delay of over a year for ¹³⁷Cs to reach peak concentrations in the daily diet intake is significant in that similar delayed peak concentrations of ¹³⁷Cs will be evident in the post-Chernobyl FDA survey of imported food cited later in this section.
• Nuclear explosion yields (megatonnage) reached a peak in 1961-62. The fifty-six explosions which followed in 1964-74 only yielded about 20% of the energy of the more extensive testing done in the early 1960's. The decline in the megatonnage of the weapons test explosions is matched by a decline in the dietary intake of weapons test derived radioactivity throughout the late 1960's to the late 1970's.

• Average daily intake of cesium-137 in California in an area upwind from many of the Nevada weapons tests dropped from an average slightly over 80 pCi per day to around 20 pCi per day by 1967 before beginning to arise again in 1968 to 30 pCi per day, probably under the influence of Chinese test explosions.

• "No direct measurements on diet samples have been made." p. 494.

• Other than elevated concentrations of ¹³⁷Cs in milk in all Florida reporting stations (seven), only six out of eighty-two other reporting stations had a twelve month average exceeding 20 pCi/l.
• The rather consistent elevated levels of radiocesium throughout Florida have yet to be explained to this editor, as there is no known connection between the phosphate industry, which causes elevated concentrations of some naturally occurring radionuclides, and cesium-137, a fission product.

• The daily radionuclide intakes of ¹³⁷Cs in the Connecticut standard diet between January and December of 1970 had a range of 20-70 pCi/day, with all months except three reporting an average of 40 pCi/day or less.

• Continued elevated levels of ¹³⁷Cs are reported in Florida (peak concentrations to 53 pCi/l, 12 month average), with isolated elevated concentrations reported in Portland, ME (23 pCi/l), and in Minnesota (peak concentrations to 39 pCi/l); almost all other stations are reporting 10 pCi/l or less of radiocesium in milk. Strontium-90 concentrations also show the same pattern of decline following the test ban agreement.

U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. (1979). FY 75-FY 76 Radionuclides in Foods. Food and Drug Administration, Washington, D.C.

• Domestic levels of cesium-137 are reported as non-detectable at all U.S. reporting stations.
• This data was collected just prior to a 1978 Chinese test explosion which resulted in elevated levels of contamination in aquatic vegetation in the vicinity of Maine Yankee, (See RAD 12: McCarthy, et al, 1978).
• The unreliability of the FDA data for this time frame is illustrated by the report of very elevated levels of radioiodine in milk in Massachusetts following a 1976 Chinese test explosion; this FDA report indicates radioiodine was not detectable in all dietary composites including dairy in 1976 (See Simpson, R.E., Shuman, F.G.D., Baratta, E.J. and Tanner, J.T. (1981) "Projected dose commitment from fallout contamination in milk resulting from the 1976 Chinese atmospheric nuclear weapons test" in RAD 8).

• The minimal data available in this brief report indicate that, between 1983-86, cesium-137 levels were below 2 Bq/kg (54 pCi/kg) in all samples except fish (up to 4 Bq/kg). The detection limit is noted as 2 Bq/kg; Figure One on p. 16 borders on the nonsensical and is nearly useless in providing information on the nuclide content of the reactor surveys in this report (The samplings in this short report were done in the vicinities of domestic nuclear reactors with approximately 500 samples collected from 11 nuclear reactors).
• This report notes that in regard to Chernobyl derived contamination in imported foods, "surveillance efforts successfully targeted contaminated foods and that contamination levels were below levels of concern for all but one oregano and three cheese samples..." This report also notes that the findings reported here include no results from the domestic total diet survey (TDS) samples collected since the Chernobyl nuclear accident.
• The inaccuracies and discrepancies along with the poor graphic quality of these FDA reports raise questions about the trustworthiness and the reliability of both the U.S. total diet surveys and the surveys of imported foods (See peak pulse analysis of Chernobyl derived radiocesium in the secret FDA report summarized later in this section).

Note: After 1980, the FDA combined their reports of anthropogenic radionuclides in domestic foods (Total Diet Study), reactor area surveys, and imported food surveys in a single, brief report.
 

B. Anthropogenic Radioactivity in Imported Foods

Simpson, R.E., Shuman, F.G.D., Baratta, E.J. and Tanner, J.T. (1981). Survey of radionuclides in foods, 1961-77. Health Physics. 40. pg. 529.
 

Radionuclides in imported foods: Summary of data
		Cesium-137			Potassium content, g/kg sample		Strontium-90
		Sp. act., pCi/kg		Intake, pCi/day			Sp. act., pCi/kg		Intake, pCi/day
Food type	Intake kg/day	FY 73	FY 74	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74	FY 74
Tea	-	296.2	296.2 (231.6)	-	20.5	19.5	430.3	555.4	-
Tea Brew	0.002	196.7	172.7	0.35	10.2	15.1	40.3	44.7	0.09
Coffee	-	99.5 (49.8)	133.7 (73.6)	-	19.3	18.8	24.3	29.2	-
Coffee Brew	0.014	40.5 (23.1)	66.2 (40.4)	(0.57)	15.8	16.0	14.4	9.8	0.14
Canned fruit	0.073	2.1	4.0	0.29	0.95	1.3 (1.2)	4.6	2.8 (2.6)	(0.19)
Cashew nuts	-	78.3	71.0 (56.8)	-	6.0	6.1	8.6	5.4	-
Fish	0.023	70.4 (44.8)	51.2 (16.2)	(0.37)	2.9	2.7	1.6	3.3 (2.05)	(0.05)
Cocoa, all types	0.003	127.4 (116.8)	131.5 (124.8)	(0.37)	16.9	16.1	64.9	61.3	0.18
Cocoa, without chocolate mix	-	127.4 (121.4)	136.5 (128.9)	-	17.8	16.6	67.5	64.0	2.24
Cheese	0.032	-	47.2 (11.8)	(0.38)	0.63	0.87 (0.82)	47.7	70.1	2.24
Fresh Fruit	0.108	-	-	-	3.3	3.7	0.60	3.3 (1.7)	(0.18)

Stroube, W.B., Jelinek, C.F. and Baratta, E.J. (1985). Survey of radionuclides in foods, 1978-1982. Health Physics. 49(5). pg. 731-735.
 

Commodity	FY '79	FY '80	FY '81	FY '82
137 Cs: pCi/kg
Cheese	18 +/- 16	12 +/- 24	21 +/- 35	92 +/- 384
Tea, dry	198 +/- 45	146 +/- 148	245 +/- 189	127 +/- 171
Tea, brew	118 +/- 46	114 +/- 84	171 +/- 300	140 +/- 121
Fish	26 +/- 9	40 +/- 89	179 +/- 580	10 +/- 18
90Sr
Cheese	31 +/- 15	31 +/- 51	34 +/- 50	33 +/- 76
Tea, dry	218 +/- 59	321 +/- 500	268 +/- 276	157 +/- 43
Tea, brew	21 +/- 6	27 +/- 47	21 +/- 15	16 +/- 12
Fish	1.3 +/- 0.6	1.0 +/- 1.8	2.4 +/- 6.0	2.2 +/- 2.4

Cunningham, W.C. and Anderson, D.L. (1994). Radionuclides in domestic and imported foods in the United States, 1987-1992. Journal of AOAC International. 77(6). pg. 1422-1427.

• The abstract to this article contains the following incorrect information which is contradicted by the contents of the report: "Approximately 2600 test portions of imported foods were analyzed for contamination associated with the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Concentrations of radionuclide were below limits of detection for the vast majority of the imported food test portions but were above the levels of concern for 23 portions. Since 1986, the fraction of imported food test portions having measurable amounts of contamination has steadily declined, as have the average concentrations of radionuclide activity." (pg. 1422).
• Over 7,000,000 imported food shipments were received during the time period covered by this report... "food types most likely to have contamination were given preference during collection." (pg. 1426).
• "During FY86 and FY87, contamination was found in approximately 40% of the samples collected and indicated that FDA inspectors were successfully targeting contaminated shipments." (pg. 1426). (emphasis added).
• The 1989 and 1990 Field Program summaries indicate that out of 307 samples tested in 1989, 24% were contaminated; in 1990, 25% of 293 samples were contaminated. No data is available for 1988. Chernobyl derived contamination levels dropped to 8% for FY91 and 2% for FY92. (pg. 1426).
• Concentrations of radionuclide activity were thus not below the limit of detection for the vast majority of the imported food test samples as indicated in the abstract. Nor have concentrations steadily declined since 1986 since a perusal of the specific food samples tested by the FDA indicates that the peak pulse of contamination in imported foods occurred between Feb. 1 and Oct. 4, 1987. (See peak pulse analysis of Chernobyl derived radiocesium in U.S.A. imported foods at the end of this section.)
• This report indicates "in spite of the general decline, contaminated foods were still occasionally found during FY91 and FY92 indeed, elk meat collected in FY91, contained the highest Cs contamination found since the Chernobyl accident occurred." (81,000 pCi/kg) (pg. 1426).
• Determination that the remaining 6,997,400 food shipments imported during this time frame contained no Chernobyl derived radiocesium or other contamination was based, according to this report, on the mental acuity of knowledgeable FDA officials who, by a magical process not specified, were able to "successfully target contaminated shipments." (pg. 1426). The exceptional insights of FDA personnel during 1986-1987 are particularly remarkable since very little data about the distribution patterns of Chernobyl derived fallout were available at this time.
• Another disturbing component about FDA reporting on Chernobyl derived contamination in imported foods is the time frame of the reporting period: this article represents the first public disclosure by the federal government that, for a period of time (1986-1988), 40% of targeted imported food samples tested positive for Chernobyl derived contamination. Not only is this information not included in the abstract of this article, but it was not available to the general public (those few who read the Journal of AOAC International) for over seven years after the peak concentrations of contamination occurred, which was, in itself, a year and a half after the accident date.
• This report is accompanied by summaries of the 1989-1990 field programs both of which contain the following note: "Past TDS findings have shown it is not uncommon to find ¹³⁷Cs activity in the Range of 2 to 20 Bq/kg in a small number of samples." It should be noted that FDA total diet surveys of domestic foods prior to the Chernobyl accident were showing almost no radiocesium contamination. (See Cunningham, 1989).
• This FDA summary may serve as a paradigm of what to expect in terms of timely information availability after a domestic nuclear accident. See RADNET's review of the Maine Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) in RAD 12, where the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) expects contamination from a domestic nuclear accident not only to stay within a fifty mile "ingestion pathway" boundary, but to be of concern for only a few weeks after a domestic accident.
• Analysis of TDS (Total Diet Study) for domestic foods "showed that the radionuclide content ... was very low." "The radionuclide content of the reactor-survey foods was low and no control measures were indicated." (pg. 1426).
• Another component of this summary as a paradigm is that the FDA continues to refer to "levels of concern" first described in the 1961 Federal Radiation Council protective action guidelines and reaffirmed after the Chernobyl accident: imported foods containing more than 10,000 pCi of a combination of ¹³⁴Cs (which was not prevalent during weapons testing fallout), and ¹³⁷Cs (ubiquitous in all nuclear industries) were (and will be) seized and destroyed. This summary makes no reference at all to the much higher FDA/FEMA protection action guidelines which would be in effect in the case of a domestic nuclear accident. See RAD 12, as well as RAD 6: Radiation Protection Guidelines, for extensive comments on the bizarre discrepancies in federal radiation protection guidelines.