Notices, Alerts and Requests for Assistance

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SECTION 15: ALERTS, NOTICES, REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE AND PUBLIC COMMENTS

Table of contents:

Introduction
Alerts
Notices
Public Comments

1. Introduction

RADNET will be posting a number of alerts pertaining to ongoing radioactive contamination controversies. RADNET welcomes any comments, criticisms, clarifications or additional information pertaining to the following notices, alerts or requests for assistance. Readers please note, alerts are listed in the order they were posted. Some alerts may no longer be of relevance, but are kept on site as posted as a matter of historical documentation.

2. Alerts

September 11 Notes

An ongoing sequence of alerts, observations, quotations and questions pertaining to the events of September 11th and their relationship to a possible attack on a United States nuclear facility. Three definitions form the context of the notes, memos and observations that follow.

Nuclear catastrophe: volatilization of an operating nuclear reactor and its reactor vessel and spent fuel pool inventory of radioisotopes. Hemispheric in distribution and impact. As noted below, most probable only in the event of a nuclear attack on a nuclear facility. The amount of radioisotopes released in a nuclear catastrophe would be +/- 100 times greater than that released at a nuclear disaster such as Chernobyl.
Nuclear disaster: a quick full core release at an operating nuclear power plant. Chernobyl and its continental, if not hemispheric, impact is an example of a nuclear disaster. A nuclear disaster does not necessarily involve the total volatilization of all the isotopes at a nuclear power plant. A quick release accident at an operating nuclear power plant would release approximately the same amount of radioactivity as released at Chernobyl. Such a release can be easily effected by cheap, easy to obtain, conventional warheads and explosives.
Nuclear materials dispersal: a discharge of lesser quantities of radioisotopes by accident or terrorist activity. An attack on a dry cask storage transport, fuel assembly failures or terrorist detonation of explosives contaminated with nuclear material are examples of nuclear incidents with local and regional impact.

ALERT: April 12, 2002 MEMO ON THE 9-11 ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER.

The Center for Biological Monitoring and The Davistown Museum have been reluctant to post the following information as a result of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. After recent discussions with a number of interested persons and organizations, and understanding and acknowledging recent federal restrictions on nuclear information of every kind and description, we believe it is in the public interest that the following information at least be a topic of public debate.

Terrorist attack on an operating nuclear reactor?

The following observations are pertinent to evaluating a terrorist attack on an operating nuclear reactor in any location, not just in the United States. The recent unfortunate escalation of hostilities between the Palestinians and Israelis provides added incentives to ponder the consequences of a terrorist attack on an operating nuclear reactor. The January 23, 2002 alert below, made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, fails to consider a much more serious terrorist threat to nuclear reactors than that posed by a hijacked aircraft. A terrorist attack on an operating reactor with the use of a surface to ground missile armed with a small nuclear warhead could have far more serious consequences. A number of observations need to be stated about this scenario:

The United States military led the world in developing a highly sophisticated repertoire of surface to ground missiles, beginning in the 1960s.
During the height of the Cold War, US military planners targeted Soviet nuclear reactors, both military and civilian; Soviet planners probably did likewise. That such facilities might become the object of a nuclear attack is a concept nearly as old as nuclear power itself.
During the 1970s, both US and Russian weapons designers developed sophisticated miniature nuclear weapons, which could be carried in a briefcase. These weapons had a fissile mass of two to six kilograms of ²³⁹Pu and were similar in design to, or could easily be adapted for use on surface to ground missiles. The sophisticated technology of miniature nuclear weapons was soon elaborated in the form of multiple re-entry warheads whereby one missile could launch twelve to twenty four warheads simultaneously.
During the last three decades of the 20th century, a selection of the sophisticated surface to ground missiles developed in the 60s and 70s, has become available to most every world government maintaining a standing army of any significance.
The breakup of the Soviet Union has provided the opportunity for the world-wide dissemination of fissile material originally produced by the Russian weapons production installations.
The advent of the internet and the large number of students from every nation at American and European universities has provided many opportunities for the dissemination of technical information useful in the construction of nuclear weapons.
The destruction of the World Trade Center by terrorists armed only with box cutters has ushered in a new era of terrorism.
US nuclear facilities offer a broad range of targets for groups of terrorists as small as one or two individuals.
With heightened airport and airspace security, the scenario outlined below by the NRC of an attack on a nuclear facility by a hijacked airliner is highly unlikely.
Much more likely is an attack on a US nuclear reactor by terrorists armed with:

U-haul truck
surface to ground missile now available on the black market for +/- one million dollars (less sophisticated missiles are available at a cheaper price, but probably wouldn't be adequate to carry a small nuclear powered warhead, total weight 10 to 30 pounds)
Two to six kilograms of fissile material obtained from _____ and fashioned into a nuclear warhead by ____________ (sophisticated students of nuclear physics with the appropriate ideological motivation).

The result of a terrorist attack on an operating nuclear reactor with a small nuclear weapon:

Total vaporization of the reactor vessel, fuel assemblies and spent fuel pool. The entire reactor vessel inventory of both short and long-lived radioisotopes and the entire inventory of long-lived radioisotopes in the spent fuel pool have the potential to be dispersed regionally, continent-wide and hemispherically. The question then arises, what is the source term of the resulting plume (A. inventories B. pathways C. destinations)

A. Inventories: How would the dispersal of this inventory compare with Chernobyl?

The inventory released in such a scenario would be approximately:

Relatively harmless noble gasses: the same source term (1 x 10⁸ Ci) as released at Chernobyl
Radioiodine: 5 to 10 times greater than the +/- 10 million Curies (Ci) released at Chernobyl
Radiocesium: +/- 100 times greater than the 1 to 2 million Ci released at Chernobyl
Other isotopes: +/- 50 times greater than released at Chernobyl

It should be noted there is a wide variety of estimates of isotopes released by the Chernobyl accident. For the indicator nuclide ¹³⁷Cs, release estimates in the various reports on Chernobyl begin at 1.2 million Ci (Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire), continue with 2.7 million (Aarkrog, 1994) and also include percentage estimates as high as 40%. A typical US nuclear reactor contains at least 20 million Ci of ¹³⁷Cs on site within the reactor vessel and spent fuel pool. (See the DOE integrated database.) The Chernobyl reactor may not have contained as much radiocesium at the time of the accident in 1986 as do US reactors in 2002.

B. The pathway would be a tropospheric wide distribution of the reactor vessel and spent fuel pool inventory by wet and dry deposition.

The Chernobyl accident demonstrated the hemispheric impact of a tropospheric accident. Unlike nuclear weapons tests, which forced large quantities of radioactivity into the stratosphere, the primary pathway of Chernobyl-derived radioactivity was within the troposphere where it was subject to relatively rapid deposition by rainfall events. The data accumulated from the Chernobyl accident demonstrates a world wide distribution of radioactivity with some of the highest levels of contamination ranging from hundreds to thousands of kilometers away. After deposition on foliar, ground and man-made surfaces, Chernobyl-derived fallout followed the well known pathways to human consumption, as would a terrorist-derived plume.

C. The destinations of most importance for radioisotopes derived from a terrorist attack would include:

A passing airborne plume of extremely dangerous, highly radioactive gasses and particulates. The short-lived isotopes in this plume would be so intense during the first 24 hours of plume passage that it is unlikely that there would be any human survivors in areas where the plume remained at ground level due to adverse weather conditions.
After the first 24 hours following core and spent fuel pool vaporization, the most intensive short-lived isotopes would have dissipated and the isotope of most significance would be ¹³¹I. During the next two weeks, this isotope would be among those providing the greatest danger to the general public due to the ease and speed with which it is bioaccumulated in the food chain.
After a period of two weeks, longer-lived isotopes such as ^134-137Cs, ⁹⁰Sr, ¹⁰⁶Ru, ¹⁴⁴Ce and ²⁴¹Pu would provide the greatest hazard, most especially from ground shine, tracking and later from bioaccumulation in the food chain.
The long term contamination of the food chain, including forage and food crops, would continue for years after plume passage.
Re-suspension and bioaccumulation of ground deposited long-lived spent fuel isotopes would provide a significant hazard to attack survivors for thousands of years.

What locations are the likely targets of a terrorist attack on a US reactor?

The most likely targets for attacks on US reactors are:

Those facilities located in the western United States where prevailing winds would bring the contamination to the bread basket of the United States in the midwest.
Facilities in or near urban areas, especially in the central and western United States, where a U-haul truck carrying a surface to ground missile wouldn't be noticeable.
Facilities in valleys where nearby roads provide access and easy targeting.
Operating nuclear reactors on the east coast such as Seabrook or Millstone are much less likely terrorist targets due to the direction of prevailing winds, which would tend to drive the desired fatal plume of vaporized radioisotopes out over the open ocean, greatly reducing the impact of the attack on the United States while exacerbating the impact on Europe.

What could be done to prevent a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor using a surface to ground missile armed with a nuclear warhead?

Nothing.
Close all 103 US nuclear reactors.
Construct and elaborate surface to air missile defense system around each reactor.

Bibliography:

Chapin, Douglas M., Cohen, Karl P., Davis, W. Kenneth, Kintner, Edwin E., Koch, Leonard J., Landis, John W., Levenson, Milton, Mandil, I. Harry, Pate, Zack T., Rockwell, Theodore, Schriesheim, Alan, Simpson, John W., Squire, Alexander, Starr, Chauncey, Stone, Henry E., Taylor, John J., Todreas, Neil E., Wolfe, Bertram and Zebroski, Edwin L. (September 20, 2002). Nuclear safety:
Nuclear power plants and their fuel as terrorist targets. Science. 297. pg. 1997-1999.

Wald, Matthew L. (September 20, 2002). Threats and responses: Reactor vulnerability: Experts say nuclear plants can survive jetliner crash. New York Times. Section A, pg. 17.

July 8, 2002: OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS: SEPTEMBER 11TH AND LOSS-OF-REACTOR-COOLANT ACCIDENTS (LORCA) AT US COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

Definitions and background information

A loss-of-reactor-coolant accident (LORCA) can occur at an operating nuclear power plant when for any number of reasons sudden changes in the horizontal flow of the reactor vessel water cycle create lateral pressures that make reinsertion of the fuel control rods impossible due to a distortion in the alignment of the fuel assemblies. The resulting loss-of-reactor-coolant accident has the potential to severely contaminate large areas of the North American continent. A LORCA can result in an uncontrolled nuclear reaction of an unknown duration.
The Chernobyl accident ended after less than two weeks time. "Approximately 135 tonnes of the 190.3-tonne initial core fuel load (~71%) at Chernobyl Unit 4 melted and flowed into the lower regions of the reactor building to form various kinds of the now-solidified lava-like fuel-containing materials (LFCMs) or corium." (Borovoi, A.A. and Sich, A.R. (1995). The Chernobyl Accident Revisited, Part II: The State of the Nuclear Fuel Located within the Chernobyl Sarcophagus. Nuclear Safety. 36 (1). pg. 1). It is highly likely that a LORCA at a US nuclear facility would end after just a few weeks time; fuel burnup during a LORCA could take months or longer.
Prior to September 11th, the most likely cause of a LORCA at any of America's 103 aging operational nuclear reactors was their deteriorating infrastructure. Any variety of water line small-break, large-break sequences or other equipment related incidents could cause a LORCA.
After September 11th, the possibility of terrorist attacks on US nuclear power plants became a matter of great public concern. The Wall Street Journal article of Wednesday, July 3, 2002 (John J. Failka, US Nuclear Plants Face Security Gaps Since Sept. 11 Raids, pg. 1, 4) provides a description of typical cautions being taken against the possibility of a terrorist attack at US nuclear power plants. "...the pre-Sept. 11 threat was considered to be a few attackers equipped with grenades, explosives, automatic weapons and an insider's knowledge of the plant's defenses. The threat also included a truck bomb carried by a sport utility vehicle. A new threat assessment, which the NRC has described to power-plant owners in secret orders and advisories, hasn't been fully spelled out yet, but it probably will involve a larger numbers of attackers, the possibility of multiple attacks against one plant and a larger truck bomb, Mr. [Richard A.] Meserve [NRC Chairman] says. ...In mock firefights four times a year, opposing teams of guards test their skills using plastic rifles that make squeaking noises and softball-sized plastic grenades accompanied by simulated explosions. During such exercises, the plant brings in an extra shift, called a 'shadow force,' that engages in the mock battle while the regular shift guards the plant. Guards sometimes 'shoot' from behind mobile barriers designed to stop bullets, and use wire-mesh screens that can be pulled out from walls to stop grenades lobbed at them by the attackers." (pg. 4).

Observations

The most likely cause of a nuclear disaster remains the aging physical plant at 103 US nuclear reactors.
Nuclear catastrophe can occur if an operational nuclear plant or complex is subject to a nuclear attack, which efficiently vaporizes its full core and spent fuel pool inventories of radioisotopes. The source term of a nuclear catastrophe is +/- 3 orders of magnitude greater than that of Chernobyl. Rainfall associated dispersal of contamination is hemispheric in extent.
A loss-of-reactor-coolant accident (LORCA) has the potential to gradually discharge a significant portion of the inventories of radioisotopes in an operational reactor vessel. The rainfall associated dispersal of this discharge will likely be continental in extent.
Other types of nuclear accidents (e.g. a terrorist attack on a dry cask transport; fuel assembly failures, etc.) can have limited regional or local impact as small geological areas are contaminated by spilled or scattered nuclear waste spent fuel fragments or other radioactive materials.
The most significant emerging threat to public safety is that of a terrorist attack on a operating nuclear plant or natural gas terminal. The Wall Street Journal article conjures up a scenarios for terrorist attack that are extremely unlikely. More likely threats to operating nuclear power plants were not referred to in this article.

The most likely future course of a LORCA other than aging infrastructure and a culture of complacency at the NRC is an attack by one or more disaffiliated American citizens in the mode of the anthrax terrorist or the midwest mail box bomber. Such an attack by American terrorists would probably utilize easy to obtain high-tech explosives and one variety of the 20 - 30 models of surface to ground missiles now available in the international arms market.
The prevalent view that the most likely terrorist attack would be by Bin Laden type terrorists is a natural outcome of the September 11th attack but, in fact, may be less likely than an attack by a domestic terrorist. The types of terrorist attack described in the Wall Street Journal article are highly unlikely given the ease with which an attack with a surface to ground missile could be carried out.
A modest effort to construct wire mesh barrier +/- 200 feet outside and above the reactor vessel and other vulnerable plant components could provide a significant safety barrier for most varieties of small scale non-nuclear missile attacks by domestic or foreign terrorists.
American nuclear power plants are highly vulnerable to attack by surface to ground missiles fired from campers, rental trucks, boats and to a lesser extent airplanes; these alternatives were not noted in the Wall Street Journal article of July 3rd. This is not to disparage the intense efforts to upgrade security at nuclear power plants and to prevent either ground or truck bomb attacks. Without a missile barrier shield, American nuclear power plants along with urban liquid natural gas terminals are America's most vulnerable targets for terrorists of any affiliation.

Questions

In the event of a LORCA (for whatever reason) and the subsequent possible radiological contamination of huge areas of the United States:

What facilities exist to track the plume pulse pathways?
Where are real time atmospheric contamination surveillance installations located (to measure atmospheric contamination in microbecquerels / cm³.) Who will collect and interpret the fallout data and how will this information be dispersed?
Where are the laboratories that would measure volumetric contamination of food, soil and other media?
Weren't these facilities and laboratories nearly nonexistent before September 11th? What is the status of the FDA laboratory at Winchester, MA for analyzing contaminated food and what is its daily capacity for functioning during a nuclear disaster?
What guidelines will be used to evaluate food contamination after a nuclear disaster (FDA? NRC?)
Will Archer Daniels Midland, General Mills and other food vendors as well as the US Government facilitate accurate surveillance of domestic food products under its supervision and control or will they obfuscate the impact of a LORCA?
Will the weather channel acknowledge and track a LORCA derived plume and discuss the relationship between rainfall (and snowfall) events and ground deposition after a LORCA for the benefit of a viewer?
Will local volunteer and paid fire companies and departments be allowed access to the database pertaining to the movement of a LORCA plume? What role will they play in implementing protective action guidelines which would inevitably be needed in impacted areas?
When a LORCA occurs for any reason, will it be accompanied by freedom of information about the plume pulse pathway? What will be the source term of a LORCA at an operating US nuclear power plant, i.e. the quantities of radioisotopes released, their pathways and their destinations? Who will inform the school children in school district _______ in the state of ________ when the ground deposition of iodine-131 goes from near zero becquerels per square meter to 890,000 Bq/m²(Hardy, et. al., 1986)? And who will document the extent and evaluate the significance of contamination?

Previous Alerts and Notices

ALERT: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MEMO WARNING OF TERROR ATTACKS
(February 2, 2002)

Here is the text of a memo from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission warning of plans for a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant:

INFORMATION ASSESSMENT TEAM ADVISORY UPDATE FOR POWER REACTORS, NON-POWER REACTORS, DECOMMISSIONING REACTORS, CATEGORY I AND III FUEL FACILITIES, INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS, AND LARGE MATERIAL LICENSEES

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THREAT ENVIRONMENT -- COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT

FBI headquarters has provided the following information to all field offices. During debriefings of an al Qaeda senior operative, he stated there would (be) a second airline attack in the U.S. The attack was already planned and three individuals were on the ground in the states recruiting non-Arabs to take part in the attack. The plan is to fly a commercial aircraft into a nuclear power plant to be chosen by the team on the ground. The plan including diverting the mission to any tall building if a military aircraft intercepts the plane. No specific timeline or location was given for the attack. As of 1/23/02, one NRC licensee, Columbia Generating Station, had been contacted by their local FBI representative. It is unknown whether other NRC licensee(s) will be contacted as well. FBI headquarters cannot at this time, provide a complete assessment of the credibility of the information. No additional actions are requested in response to this advisory at this time.
In the light of the continuing high level of threat, NRC reaffirms its request that any information regarding threats or suspicious activities should be reported immediately to the NRC operations center, 301-816-6100. This advisory does not supersede any previous advisories presently in effect. You will be advised of any pertinent changes as soon as possible.

ALERT: RADIOACTIVE PLUME ("SMOKE") IN UKRAINE

March 13, 2001, the Center for Biological Monitoring received a call that a radioactive plume had been detected in the Ukraine around mid-day eastern standard time in the U.S. This had been reported on Swedish radio. Anyone with information about this report please call or fax us (207) 288-5126 voice and (207) 288-2725 fax.

ALERT: DECOMMISSIONING-DERIVED PULSED RELEASE DISCHARGE AT THE MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY.
(June 1999)

Alert
Visitors to this site please take notice of the following advisory Due to the sloppy and hasty decommissioning techniques, inadequate historic site assessment and deficiencies in radiological surveillance techniques and databases at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company in Wiscasset, ME, the Center for Biological Monitoring is issuing the following advisory for the possible remobilization of hot particles, CRUD, activation products and spent fuel-derived fission products. These include the long-lived isotopes in spent fuel, in order of their preponderance:
¹³⁷Cs (1/2 T = 30 years), ⁹⁰Sr (1/2 T = 29 years), ²⁴¹Pu (1/2 T = 14 years), ²⁴²Cu (1/2 T = 162 days), ²³⁸Pu (1/2 T = 89 years), ²⁴⁰Pu (1/2 T = 6,260 years), ²³⁹Pu (1/2 T = 24,400 years) and ²⁴¹Am (1/2 T = 458 years) For more information on this subject see: Brack, H. G., ed. A Review of Radiological Surveillance Reports of Waste Effluents in Marine Pathways at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company at Wiscasset, Maine--- 1970-1984: An Annotated Bibliography. Hulls Cove, ME: Pennywheel Press, 1986. (pg. 5-8).
Center for Biological Monitoring. Patterns of Noncompliance: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company: Generic and Site-specific Deficiencies in Radiological Surveillance Programs. Brack, H.G., Ed., Hulls Cove, ME: Pennywheel Press, 1998.
Environmental Protection Agency. (1982). Draft environmental impact statement: Environmental standards for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes. Report No. 520/1-82-025. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (1992). Integrated data base for 1992: U.S. spent fuel and radioactive waste inventories, projections and characteristics. Technical Report DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 8. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN. http://www.em.doe.gov/idb95

Comments on this alert: please send email to: cbm@davistownmuseum.org

The strong tidal sweep of the Sheepscot back river combines with the labyrinth of coves, islands and river systems to allow MYAPC liquid effluent discharges and runoff to have the potential to impact a wide area of sensitive marine ecosystems in the coastal area between the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers. The quantities, pathways and current locations of fuel assembly-derived fission products and other contaminants remain essentially unknown. The first major decommissioning activity to impact the sensitive marine ecosystems in this area were the 1998 reactor water systems flush which released unknown quantities of radioactivity to the licensed radioactive waste disposal area (sewer) of Montsweag Bay. Current decommissioning activities that also have or will impact this environment include the breaching of the reactor containment for large component removal (the breaching is completed) and the reactor vessel segmentation, which will commence shortly. These activities combine with recent heavy rainfall events of the last few weeks to provide pathways for the spread of fission products such as ¹³⁷Cs, ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴¹Pu, ²⁴¹Am and other long-lived isotopes over a wide area.

Most residents living in the area around the Maine Yankee facility appear to be satisfied with licensee, state, NRC and Friends of the Coast assertions of the relative safety of these decommissioning activities. If you are in the extreme minority of persons living in or visiting this area who share our concerns about the undocumented releases of radioactivity from this facility you may find it prudent to:

Limit consumption of seafoods harvested from the sensitive marine ecosystems of this area, especially sea vegetables a sensitive bioindicator, shellfish of any description and lobsters caught close in to the reactor site (+/- 5 miles).
Have children avoid contact with floc line debris (the seaweed and other materials left at the high tide line in most all marine environs) anywhere within 15 miles of the MYAPC reactor.
This advisory includes the following areas: the Sheepscot back river from Wiscasset Harbor south to Robin Hood Cove including Westport Island, northeast Arrowsic Island, the northern sections of Georgetown Island; the Sheepscot River north of Wiscasset Harbor to the head of the tide at Alna, and the Sheepscot River south of Wiscasset Harbor to Baker Island.
In view of the unknown amounts and locations of fission products lost from MYAPC's 66 failed fuel assemblies, repeated official assertions (MYAPC, NRC, state of Maine, Friends of the Coast) about the "safe" radiological status of sensitive marine ecosystems cannot be verified by a nonexistent database.
In view of the breached reactor containment, recent heavy rainfall events and the upcoming segmentation of reactor vessel internals, persons visiting Maine during the summer season may wish to inquire about the point of origin of Maine seafoods they are consuming.
Marine resources within 10 miles in any direction of the MYAPC reactor site should have been closed at the time of the 1998 reactor water systems flush and now should be closed while the reactor containment remains breached and while reactor vessel segmentation and barge loading is taking place. The licensee has recently closed a small area in the vicinity of the barge berth; this closed zone should be greatly extended.
In the following weeks and months, the state of Maine, the licensee and the seafood industry of Maine will be vehemently insistent that all seafood consumed in the state of Maine is totally unimpacted by the dirty decommissioning process now underway. If seafoods harvested within 10 miles of MYAPC are mixed with seafoods harvested from unimpacted areas, the result could be a disaster for the Maine tourist industry.

Persons earning a living from the marine environment in the vicinity of MYAPC should be compensated by the licensee and the state of Maine if and when these areas are closed to the harvesting of marine resources.

ALERT: TOKAI, JAPAN, JCO LTD. URANIUM PROCESSING PLANT

September 30, 1999, 10:35 AM Japanese standard time: Criticality accident at a Japanese Uranium Processing Plant.

The accident at the Tokaimura complex is actually a relatively small nuclear accident involving 16 kg. of highly enriched uranium poured into a settling basin designed for only 2.4 kg. This compares with potential accidents at nuclear reactors which could theoretically involve as much as 50 to 70 tons of uranium, or at nuclear weapons fabrication or storage sites where the amount of fissile material could be an order of magnitude higher than a worse case accident at a reactor site.

This accident was initially classified by the IAEA as a level 4 accident (7 being the worst, e.g. Chernobyl.) The Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) has noted their skepticism of the IAEA accident classification, suggesting it might be a 5. A level 4 accident is an event "without significant offsite risk." Since almost no information is available about the source term (isotopic release inventory) of this accident, CNIC feels it is premature to suggest that it is only a level 4 accident.

Under any conditions, because only a small amount of fissile material was involved in this accident, any significant impact from the plume passage would be limited to an area around the facility extending a few kilometers to, at most, a few hundred kilometers. Most of the activity from the intense radiation field surrounding the accident site was a result of shine from the enriched uranium in the settling basin. The accident was controled by draining water from around the settling basin by breaking the pipes leading to the basin (remote control remediation efforts failed) at which time ambient radiation levels, which had been 10 to 15 thousand times above normal, returned to "near normal." While no specific information is available about the isotopic footprint of the resulting plume, because only a small amount of fissile material was involved, extensive contamination by long-lived isotopes such as ¹³⁷Cs in the form of ground contamination is unlikely.

For more information on this small accident link to RAD 3: Major Nuclear Accidents-in-Progress. Information on the isotopic content of the accident plume will be posted as data becomes available (this may take months to years.)

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

The Center for Biological Monitoring would appreciate any data (or information on where to obtain this data) on the air deposition in microbecquerels / cubic meter and ground deposition in bequerels / square meter.

ALERT: UKRAINE - NUCLEAR EXPERTS WARN THAT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE CREATING A NUCLEAR ENERGY CRISIS.

"Consumers' consistent failure to pay for electricity supplies has left nuclear plants unable to pay their employees on time and modernize aging equipment." (Associated Press Worldstream, Feb. 8, 1999). "The industry is deteriorating on all sides - economic, technological, organizational and personnel." (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 10, 1999). The existing facilities are unable to meet current electricity demand, consumers are unable to pay and reactor safety is compromised.

ALERT: NRC WARNS THAT CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN POWER GENERATION IS NOT TIGHT ENOUGH.

These warnings have been excerpted from the following article:

(December 22, 1998). International concern at radioactive smuggling growing. Nuclear Engineering International. pg. 8.

"Greta Dicus, a commissioner at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has warned that control over radioactive sources in activities other than power generation is not tight enough. ... Accidents have occurred in the fields of irradiation, industrial radiography and teletherapy."
"One area particularly effected by this problem is the international trade in waste scrap. There has been a significant increase in the quantities of recycled metal which is radioactively contaminated entering the international market. In recent months the Aceranex steel plant in Spain unwittingly melted steel contaminated with caesium 137 and a scrap metal dealer in northern England found part of a radioactive reactor vessel in a shipment of recycled steel from Russia."
"'Since 1983, US steel mills accidentally melted radioactive sources on 20 occasions and radioactive sources have accidentally been melted at other metal mills on 11 other occasions,' said Dicus. 'While radiation exposures of mill workers and the public have, thus far, been low, the financial consequences have been large. US steel mills have incurred costs averaging $8-10 million as a result of these events and, in one case, the cost was $23 million.'"
"Theft of radioactive sources is becoming an increasing problem, particularly in eastern Europe where a perception exists that the sources have a significant monetary value. Often when thieves realize the material has little value they discard them in scrap metal."

ALERT: MISSING -- FULL REPORT ON THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT.

Reprinted below is a notorized statement by Jane Rickover.

"In May, 1983, my father-in-law, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, told me that at the time of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident, a full report was commissioned by President Jimmy Carter. He [my father-in-law] said that the report, if published in its entirety, would have destroyed the civilian nuclear power industry because the accident at Three Mile Island was infinitely more dangerous than was ever made public. He told me that he had used his enormous personal influence with President Carter to persuade him to publish the report only in a highly "diluted" form. The President himself had originally wished the full report to be made public. In November, 1985, my father-in-law told me that he had come to deeply regret his action in persuading President Carter to suppress the most alarming aspects of that report."

[Signed] Jane Rickover

Notorized by William F. Lamson Q.C.
Notory Public for the Province of Ontario
Toronto, this 18th day of July A.D. 1986

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

RADNET would appreciate notification from anyone of where we can obtain the FULL copy of President Carter's 1979 report - not the partial report that was released to the public. Also please advise us of any information you might have about this report.

ALERT: REACTOR VESSEL GTCC WASTES TO BE RESCHEDULED AS CLASS C LOW-LEVEL WASTES

In the summer of 1997, a proposal surfaced from the owners of the Trojan Nuclear Plant in Washington state (closed in 1992) to site their reactor vessel in an uncontained land burial at the Hanaford Reservation with all the Greater Than Class C reactor vessel components intact in one 1,200+ ton "package." A final decision on this proposal is expected from the NRC in the spring of 1998. This proposed rescheduling of reactor vessel GTCC wastes as class C wastes (by averaging all reactor vessel class A, class C and GTCC components together) has set a precedent which if implemented will be followed in most if not all future NRC licensee decommissioning scenarios. Recently both the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck facility have proposed the possibility of also siting their reactor vessels as one intact class C "package" at the Barnwell, S.C. "low-level waste" landfill. This development should be of interest to anyone with an interest in what constitutes "low-level waste" and its consequential siting in existing low-level waste facilities (e.g. Betty Nevada) or those proposed for future development (Ward Valley, CA; Sierra Blanca, TX; etc.) For further information on this proposal, please see our postings on the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company as a case study in RAD 12: Twilight of the Nuclear Era: Part 5: Decommissioning Debacle.

ALERT: WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ROD LEAKAGE

"Grid to rod fretting" has been identified as the cause of leaky fuel assemblies at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station in Wiscasset, Maine. (See the annotations of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company: Restart Readiness Plan in RAD 12: 2-E: Public Safety Bibliography.)

MYAPC and NRC reports indicate the most damaged fuel assemblies were manufactured by Westinghouse, Inc. The fretting (cutting into) occurs when the reactor vessel grids holding the fuel assemblies rub against the assemblies, gradually wearing down "frets" which allow fuel leakage. Concerned citizens in the vicinity of nuclear stations using Westinghouse fuel assemblies (or in the vicinity of any nuclear power station) should be alerted to the vulnerability of Westinghouse assemblies to damage by grid to rod fretting. Search NRC files for more information (See RAD 13: RADLINKS: Part II D-5). Check licensee inspection reports, licensee event reports, etc. (posted 4/3/97).

ALERT: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT-IN-PROGRESS: THE ROCKY FLATS TECHNOLOGY SITE

RADNET has chosen the former Rocky Flats nuclear weapons production site northwest of Denver, CO as the location of the largest current nuclear accident-in-progress within the continental United States. Other locations including Hanford (Washington), the Savannah River Plant, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee have been the locations of much larger uncontained releases of radioactive effluents to the environment then the Rocky Flats site. No location, however possesses the unique combinations of large onsite inventories of ^239,240Pu, high winds in a dry environment, and close proximity to highly populated areas. The chronic low-level release of plutonium to the environment at this location began with the instigation of weapons production in the late 1950's, and was exacerbated by three major fires in the late 1960's as well as an additional 600 minor fires which spread plutonium throughout the region (see New York Times 12/11/96, p. A16). Significant quantities of plutonium have been accidentally spilled or deliberately disposed of in soils within the facility boundaries; additional significant quantities of plutonium now reside in the duct work and other components of at least 5 large weapons production related buildings which remain on site at this location. The total health physics impact of the chronic release of low-levels of plutonium from this facility is particularly dependent on future environmental remediation practices which have the potential to terminate, or to exacerbate the source term release from this accident-in-progress. Of particular interest will be the success or failure of DOE sponsored environmental management activities to deconstruct the buildings containing the greatest amount of plutonium contamination. The prospect of additional fire events pose the threat of enhancing the existing plutonium plume, which would spread additional quantities of plutonium throughout the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountain region. Also of significant interest will be the success or failure of future remediation activities in preventing the resuspension and further spread of the plutonium now contained in soil throughout the Rocky Flats complex. Successful remediation activities in the next decade or two may allow the reclassification of the Rocky Flats plutonium plume from its current status as the most dangerous continental source point of anthropogenic radioactivity to one of less significance. Such a reclassification is highly dependent upon the availability and the rapid and efficient expenditure of large quantities of money (Federal tax dollars) in a successful remediation effort. Given the economically challenged status of the federal budget in general and DOE environmental remediation programs in particular, as well as the questionable relationship between funds expended versus remediation success achieved, it is unlikely that sufficient federal funding will be available to provide the basis for mitigation of this nuclear accident-in-progress. Even if funds are available, will remediation efforts be successful? Due to the long radioactive half life of ²³⁹Pu (1/2 T = 24,240 years), the Rocky Flats plutonium plume has the potential to continue to spread contamination for several millennium. Under any conditions it is unlikely, except during the few hours of a serious fire, that the plutonium released during this accident will exceed regulatory guidelines. This may be the only condolence in a nuclear accident scenario the primary impact of which is beyond remediation.

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

RADNET reviewers are solicited for any additional information and reports which are not already cited in RAD 11: Major Plume Source Points, Section 4: US Military Source Points: Rocky Flats.

ALERT: MOX FUEL/GALLIUM CONTROVERSY

Persons concerned with a recent Dept. of Energy decision to dispose of excess weapons production derived plutonium through a dual track process please note the following information. The Dept. of Energy has suggested disposing of excess plutonium not only via vitrification and burial of weapons grade plutonium, but also incorporated into a mixed oxide fuel (MOX) to be burned in commercial reactors. The objective of both of these disposal plans has been to keep this plutonium out of the hands of terrorists. While the plan to use vitrification to dispose of excess plutonium goes back several decades, the more recent DOE decision to mix the plutonium with uranium and burn the resulting fuel in commercial reactors (about 3% of the MOX fuel is plutonium) has a number of controversial consequences. Only a few (12) reactor owners have expressed interest in using the MOX alternative, which requires expensive facility adaptations which would have to be funded by an act of Congress. More importantly, burning the MOX fuel only eliminates a small percentage of the plutonium, creating huge additional inventories of high-level wastes. A third complication has recently been revealed by 2 Los Alamos scientists: plutonium from warheads contains approximately 1% gallium, which was added during warhead production to facilitate the manufacturing process. If this gallium remains in the plutonium incorporated into the MOX fuel, resulting gallium laced products of the fission process will attack the zirconium fuel cladding in commercial reactors causing cladding deterioration and additional significant safety and waste production problems. As a result of this potentially adverse chemical reaction, plutonium destined for use as MOX fuel has to be reprocessed for gallium extraction prior to incorporation in MOX fuel. This recent development further complicates an already difficult situation. Russia owns huge quantities of surplus plutonium left over from the end of the cold war; the objective of the DOE program was to mollify the Russians who disapprove of the vitrification and burial of such a valuable substance as weapons grade plutonium, which they also intend to burn in a MOX fuel scenario. A full copy of the Los Alamos Report by Dr. James Toevs and Carl Beard has been printed in the newsletter of the IEER (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research) and is available at URL: http://www.ieer.org/ieer/latest/gallium.htmlor see RAD 13: RADLINKS II-A: IEER. Arjun Makhijani also has two reports summarizing the plutonium-MOX issue. These are presently available electronically at the same site and are also cited in RAD 11: part 2: General Bibliography; see Makhijani: Heading off the plutonium peril, as well as Makhijani: Technical aspects of the use of weapons plutonium as a reactor fuel. It should be pointed out that while the MOX fuel alternative is extremely unsatisfactory, expensive and risky, the vitrification plan, while technologically feasible, requires huge quantities of scarce public funds which are unlikely to be available in quantities sufficient to vitrify the tons of plutonium which are one of the many legacies of the nuclear arms race. Needless to say, a final geological depository of vitrified plutonium is as elusive as the funding necessary for its construction. (posted 2/3/97, updated 4/17/97).

ALERT: CHEMICAL FALLOUT WARNING.

The Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) is the leader in the development of environmental remediation technologies. One of the key remediation technologies discussed in the SRTC home page is "air stripping" whereby plumes of contaminated groundwater are partially cleansed by pumping the contaminated water to the surface and using the air stripping technology to remove by evaporation most of the volatile organic compounds (VOC's). The editor of RADNET would like to make reference to Chemical Fallout: Current Research on Persistent Pesticides edited by Miller and Berg, 1969, in which R. W. Riesbrough and others documented VOC's including polychlorinated biphenyl's in Antarctic sea birds and marine fish in the San Francisco Bay and other Pacific locations. The VOC's were presumed to have entered the atmosphere as vapors during the manufacturing process or by gradual volatilization or incineration. (pg. 11). Since the publication of this classic in the field of chemical fallout studies, there has been a growing awareness of the important role weapons production has played in the proliferation of chemical fallout source points. A review of Nuclear Wastelands (Makhijani, 1995, see RAD 11: Part 5, Major Plume Source Points) as well as many of the publications of the Department of Energy including the BEMR, and of information provided in the SRTC home page indicates that in retrospect U.S. and Russian military weapons production facilities which utilized evaporating pits, ponds, lagoons and massive uncontained releases of mixed wastes containing large quantities of VOC's have been a major source of chemical fallout. As of 1997, residents of Maine as well as many other locations in the northern hemisphere have been or are being warned to limit consumption of almost all varieties of fresh water fish and some marine species which migrate to and spawn in fresh water sources due to their bioaccumulation of these volatile chemicals.

WARNING: the SRTC and other DOE environmental management departments are beginning an intensive program of groundwater remediation using air stripping technologies to remove a lengthy list of VOC's. The DOE, the DOD and the EPA as well as private vendors also make extensive use of clay lined pits for evaporating VOC's. Evaporation of volatile organic compounds including PCB's, benzenes, trichloroethylene and other dangerous chemicals ensures a hemispheric wide distribution of these contaminants. These environmental remediation programs, many of which are in their infancy, will result in the efficient distribution of these contaminants throughout the biosphere. In retrospect, pollution from agricultural and non-military industrial source points of VOC's may play a less significant role in the world-wide spread of chemical fallout than the huge weapons production-derived inventories of VOC's which are now becoming available for hemispheric wide dispersion.

ALERT: MISSING WEAPONS PRODUCTION HIGH-LEVEL WASTE.

As noted in RAD 11, Parts 4 and 11, there is an anomaly in data pertaining to commercial nuclear power production of spent fuel wastes versus military weapons production of spent fuel and high-level wastes. The DOE Integrated Database report for 1994 indicates US commercial nuclear power plants have accumulated 30,200,000,000 curies of spent fuel high-level waste as of Jan. 1, 1996 compared to an incomplete inventory of weapons production high-level wastes (at only four DOE/DOD locations) of 957,900,000 curies. In view of the commercial production of plutonium 239 in power plant spent fuel (141 metric tons) versus DOE/DOD production of plutonium 239 for weapons (111 metric tons), additional information about the quantities and locations of UNCONTAINED military spent fuel and high-level waste is urgently needed. RADNET suggests the following categorization of contained and uncontained military spent fuel and high-level waste production:

CONTAINED SPENT FUEL HIGH-LEVEL WASTE:

957,900,000 curies as noted in the DOE Integrated Database.

Other probable locations for contained and uncontained military spent fuel and high-level waste: (?)

POTENTIAL FUTURE SOURCES OF UNCONTAINED AND/OR RECYCLED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE:

SNAP POWER SOURCES:

(²³⁸ Pu etc. in satellites, buoys, and other applications and locations)

FOOD IRRADIATION EQUIPMENT:

(Cesium 137)

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS:

(?)

OTHER INDUSTRIAL USES:

(?)

UNCONTAINED RELEASES: DEEPWELL INJECTION

INEL and etc. (?)

UNCONTAINED RELEASES: TERRESTRIAL ENVIRONMENT:

canyons and other desiccated environments. LANL, etc. (?)

UNCONTAINED RELEASES: TERRESTRIAL ENVIRONMENT:

uncontained and/or undocumented land burial. ORNL, etc. (?)

UNCONTAINED RELEASES: TERRESTRIAL ENVIRONMENT:

ponds, lagoons, and streams, SRR, etc. (?)

UNCONTAINED RELEASES: MARINE ENVIRONMENT:

ocean dumping (?)

LOST AND UNACCOUNTED FOR:

(?)

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

RADNET reviewers are solicited for any additional information, documentation or opinions which would assist in reconciling the discrepancy in commercial spent fuel inventories versus military high-level waste and spent fuel inventories.

ALERT: MAINE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (MRERP): DISCREPANCIES AND DEFICIENCIES

The MRERP is the emergency response plan mandated and supervised by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for implementation by the licensee and local and state authorities during a serious nuclear accident at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (MYAPS).
Extensive on site radiological monitoring equipment at MYAPS is not matched by radiological monitoring equipment or capacity located outside of the plant perimeter in areas which would certainly be impacted during a major nuclear accident.
The MYAPC and the NRC maintain a total of 78 TLD's (Thermoluminescent dosimeters) around the MYAPS. These dosimeters, which accumulate data about ambient radiation levels, must be removed and sent to a laboratory for analysis. Under emergency conditions these primitive dosimeters (circa 1950) provide almost no information about the time and intensity of accident plume passages. The information these dosimeters contain are cumulative composites of ambient radiation levels and provide no real time data about air concentrations, media-specific, nuclide-specific contamination levels, or information about ground level contamination.
These 78 dosimeters are located in two perimeters around the MYAPS. Fifty eight NRC and MYAPC dosimeters are located within a 2 mile radius of the plant; the remaining 20 dosimeters are located in an outer perimeter averaging 10 miles from the plant.
The State of Maine maintains 17 electronic real time Eberline dosimeters located within the first (2 mile) perimeter. These monitors provide more accurate data about the time and intensity of ground level plumes, but otherwise tend to duplicate the function of the more primitive TLD's.
These ground level monitors will provide little or no information about an actual plume release which will in most cases travel well above the ground level TLD's and State of Maine monitors in most emergency situations.
Weather conditions which will allow plume passage at ground level will tend to greatly increase local casualties in a major nuclear accident as the risk for residents evacuating an accident situation under these meteorological conditions is greatly enhanced. In contrast with a scenario with a ground level plume passage, the Chernobyl accident was characterized by ejection of most radiological emissions into the troposphere due to a combination of plant design and favorable weather conditions.
MRERP provisions for mobile ground level radiological surveillance are dependent on primitive equipment, a near total lack of trained personnel, untested assumptions about human behavior in an actual accident situation, and a reliance on outdated laboratory equipment in Augusta, Maine which can only provide detailed radiological analysis of a few samples per day. Laboratory capacity for media-specific nuclide specific analysis outside of Maine, at Winchester, MA and Brookhaven, NY are equally outdated and inadequate, as are the single mobile laboratories available from the EPA and NRC.
There is essentially a complete lack of emergency radiological monitoring capacity in areas in excess of 10 miles in distance from the MYAPS. This deficiency is the result of ancient pre-Chernobyl FEMA and NRC paradigms which assume that the impact of a major nuclear accident will be primarily limited to a 10 mile radius around the MYAPS, with some additional impact possible within a 50 mile radius. The Chernobyl accident and it's hemispheric wide impact illustrated the obsolete nature of assumptions upon which MRERP is based.
Federal accident response capacities for aerial assessment are unknown. The status of the Aerial Measuring System (AMS) sponsored by the DOE is not available for accurate evaluation, and the computer based Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) based at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has apparently been undercut by limitations on federal funding. Under normal conditions the data generated by these aerial radiological monitoring systems is not accessible to the general public; in emergency conditions the timely availability of this normally classified data to authorized persons in emergency operation centers (EOC's) is extremely unlikely.
The result of the lack of radiological monitoring data in emergency situations for areas outside a 10-20 mile radius of the MYAPS is that what little information is available is completely controlled by a licensee which has a distinct conflict of interest between the economic impact of an accident on plant viability and the obligation to provide accurate radiological data during an emergency. Authorized emergency personnel and first responders living in communities outside of the immediate vicinity of the MYAPS should be alerted to the discrepancies and deficiencies in the MRERP and the fact that the licensee, the MYAPC, will control almost all the radiological monitoring data which will emanate from the EOC's maintained by the NRC, the licensee and communities adjacent to the plant. This radiological monitoring information, of questionable veracity or accuracy, will pass down a chain of command which includes a very small but complacent and unquestioning State of Maine Department of Human Services radiation monitoring bureaucracy. In an emergency situation, the radiological monitoring data pertaining to the severity and intensity of a radioactive plume passage available to fire departments and other emergency personnel will range from unreliable to inaccurate to unavailable. Emergency personnel in areas away from MYAPS should be reminded that in the event of an accident at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station there is essentially no radiological monitoring equipment to provide real-time air concentrations, or media-specific, nuclide-specific (including ground deposition) data for the evaluation of the impact of a nuclear accident in your community.
MRERP is further characterized by extraordinary discrepancies in the radiation protection guidelines for authorized persons in the EOC's versus the guidelines for ordinary citizens. For more details about this rather complicated issue see RADNET Section 6, Radiation protection guidelines as well as the comments in RADNET Section 12 on the State of Maine Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These discrepancies are a symbol of the many anomalies and deficiencies of NRC, FEMA, and other radiological emergency plans, paradigms, and assumptions.
"This radiological emergency response plan therefore involves the mobilization of hundreds of persons to staff emergency operations centers in preparation for evacuating tens of thousands of persons during a nuclear accident in which almost no accurate and reliable real-time data is available about radioactive plume size, movement or characteristics. This RERP could easily serve to increase exposure of local residents to an accident plume, rather than to mitigate exposure." (RADNET Section 12, pg. 15.) Extensive additional comments on the MRERP are contained in RADNET Section 12, in the annotation of this citation.

ALERT: DEFECTIVE FUEL ROD DATABASE (DFRD)

In the first half of the first decade of United States commercial nuclear power production, defective fuel assemblies were ubiquitous in many nuclear power plants in this country as well as abroad. Comments about these defective fuel assemblies appear in many NRC and NRC licensee publications and annual environmental reports. Due to inadequate and in fact nearly non-existent NRC environmental monitoring standards, the environmental impact of these defective fuel assemblies is virtually unknown. Many of these defective fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pools of US nuclear power plants (e.g. MYAPC) and will pose an additional costly problem at the time of decommissioning.

The NRC is currently planning a research program to evaluate the exposure of high burnup fuel cladding to a simulated Loss-Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Recently concerns have been raised as to whether fuel cladding subjected to high burnup conditions could fail at lower levels of energy deposition than earlier assumed by NRC regulators. NRC licensees are currently attempting to extend the burnup time of the uranium fuel for the purpose of extracting more power output. The proposed NRC testing is an attempt to determine if it is safe to extend fuel burnup; this research program may shed some light on not only extended fuel burnup, but whether unrecognized dangers for fuel cladding failure previously existed, especially during a reactivity insertion accident scenario (See NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 Section 46: Fuel cladding temperatures should not exceed 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit; total oxidation of fuel cladding must not exceed 17% of the cladding thickness). Fuel cladding properties change at higher burnup temperatures: what dangers does this pose? What pre-existing dangers are posed by fuel cladding which will fail at lower levels of energy deposition than previously assumed? What dangers are currently posed by the pin holes in Maine Yankee fuel cladding which are apparently the source of ¹²⁹I leakage in the reactor vessel (1/3/97)? The NRC research program on fuel cladding will be executed by the Argonne National Laboratory.

Also see the previous RADNET alert on grid to rod fretting in Westinghouse fuel assemblies. RADNET has insufficient information to determine whether the recent leakage in MYAPC Westinghouse-produced fuel assemblies is due entirely to grid to rod fretting, or whether MYAPC fuel from other vendors is subject to pin-hole leaks for reasons other than grid to rod fretting.

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

RADNET reviewers are solicited for any additional information and reports which document the environmental impact of these defective fuel assemblies.

ALERT: AMERICIUM - 241

Americium 241 (1/2 t = 432y) is a decay product of plutonium 241 (1/2 t = 14.5y). Plutonium 241 is a ubiquitous contaminant of the fission process. The DOE Integrated Database for 1994 lists spent fuel inventory of ²⁴¹Pu as of Jan. 1, 1996 at 2,490,000,000 curies. RADNET uses a factor of 5 (times DOE Integrated Database commercial spent fuel nuclide inventories) to estimate worldwide anthropogenic inventories of radioactive contamination of any spent fuel nuclide. (RADNET adds a factor of 2 for foreign nuclear power facilities and a factor of 2 for all military weapons production contaminants). World wide inventories of plutonium 241 are now in excess of 12 billion curies. The DOE Integrated Database lists the current commercial spent fuel inventory of americium 241 at 36,900,000 curies (world wide inventories in excess of 180,000,000 curies). Numerous reports annotated in RADNET warn that americium 241 will become an important source of exposure as plutonium 241 decays. RADNET reviewers are alerted that marine concentration ratios for americium in plankton, benthic algae, benthic macrophytes, benthic invertebrates, and fish are ten times higher than for plutonium. See RADNET Section 14, Hanson W. G. (1980) pg. 620. Americium 241 is thus a highly mobile, hemispherically dispersed, biologically significant radionuclide which will constitute a significant source of exposure in the next millennium.

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

RADNET reviewers are solicited for any additional information and reports which document the environmental impact of increasing levels of americium 241 contamination of the environment and which are not already listed in RADNET.

ALERT - TECHNETIUM - 99

Monitoring by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) of lobsters, seaweed, mussels, winkles, and limpets in the North Sea near Sellafield, England has identified a rapid increase in technetium 99 levels since 1993. A December 14, 1996 report in the Daily Telegraph indicates the source of the technetium is British Nuclear Fuel's EARP Plant, recently opened at approximately opened at the same time as the Thorp fuel reprocessing plant. The Daily Telegraph report, quoting MAFF data printed in the environmental journal The Ends, indicates⁹⁹Tc has increased 40 fold in lobsters since 1993, and contamination is now 13 times higher in seafood than allowed by European Union (EU) standards. Technetium is a radionuclide with relatively low abundance in commercial spent fuel: the DOE Integrated Database indicates a cumulative total of 345,000 curies in US commercial spent fuel inventories. Questions RADNET would like to pose are: why are such large amounts of this long lived (1/2 T = 210,000 years), low Mev radionuclide being produced by this Sellafield facility? What characteristics make this obscure contaminant so biologically available? More information about the technetium pulse originating from Sellafield will be posted as soon as RADNET can obtain more information from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

RADNET reviewers are solicited for any additional information and reports which document the release of technetium 99 from Sellafield and/or any other plume source point.

3. Notices

Most notices posted in this section by RADNET will pertain to the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company in Wiscasset. RADNET readers please refer to the Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS) for notices pertaining to developments with respect to nuclear issues on the national level (RADNET Section 13: RADLINKS Part II-A).

NOTICE:

RADNET is waiting for the release of the NRC Office of Investigation (OI) report on the MYAPC power uprate scam. This report has been referred to the Department of Justice, Office of the US Attorney in Maine for review and possible prosecution. As soon as the Office of US Attorney decides upon what course of action to take, the report will be released for public scrutiny and will be reviewed and annotated by RADNET. The editor of RADNET would like to make the observation that, based upon conversations with this office, the Office of the US Attorney in Maine was and is among the most uninformed public bureaucracies with respect to nuclear issues including evasions of waste disposal and decommissioning funding, nuclear safety issues, and in general the ongoing technical and procedural problems now confronting the nuclear industry. Successful prosecution by the Department of Justice of the MYAPC and the YAEC for the alleged charges of wrongdoing now pending is extremely unlikely. Diversion of attention away from the criminal activities involved in the illegal power uprate at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company is a likely result of the lengthy review process now underway at the Office of the US Attorney in Maine.

4. Public Comments

This section is provided for the public to add their comments, observations, insults, jokes, etc. of a favorable or unfavorable nature. Please identify yourself to the RADNET editors and provide an email address which will be published with your text. Indicate if your name can also be published. No obscene information will be accepted.

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