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The fundamental basis of the MYAPC as well as of any
nuclear power plant is the creation of wealth based on the generation of
nuclear waste. The essence of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme is the
collection of the profits resulting from boiling water using fissile material
while avoiding the costs of waste disposal and safe plant operation. Federal
law permits, and in fact, encourages, this wasteful process as an unfortunate
footnote to the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear technologies
which it spawned. Nuclear power would never have evolved as a principal
means of generating electricity without politically based government subsidies
for the design and construction of nuclear plants and the training of its
operators and overseers (especially from the nuclear navy) or without the
legal loopholes provided by the incompetence of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) allowing evasion of the costs of waste disposal and decommissioning.
These subsidies, once the basis for the growth of the nuclear power industry,
no longer serve any useful purpose. The buy now pay later philosophy inherent
in these subsidies is now a constituent of the declining viability of this
A second component of the decline of the economic viability
of the nuclear power industry is that the current propensity of the federal
government to deregulate the electrical power industry undermines any remaining
benefit derived from the federal subsidies which have artificially supported
the nuclear industry up to the present time. It is not the purpose of RADNET
to analyze or document this change in federal policy favoring less government
regulation, but the fact remains that even with extensive government subsidies
(i.e. federal assistance in evading waste disposal and decommissioning
costs, etc.) we have now entered the twilight of the nuclear era due to
the high cost of maintaining unsafe aging nuclear facilities. The deregulation
of the energy industry and the widespread availability of energy sources
that are now much less expensive than nuclear electricity sound the final
death knell of the nuclear power industry.
A third critical component of the loss of economic
viability of the nuclear power industry is the recent turn of events prompted
by whistleblower revelations which have resulted in a more intense NRC
scrutiny of inadequacies and design defects in existing safety systems.
The reevaluation of the safety systems not only at MYAPC, but at other
NRC supervised facilities has resulted in a series of plant closures and
a cascade of repair bills. The economic impact of updating plant equipment
and replacing defective safety systems is of sufficient significance in
and of itself to render the nuclear industry at a competitive disadvantage
even without the loss of regulatory protection, government subsidies, Cold
War coattail patronage or FERC loopholes. Upgrading unsafe reactors is
an extremely costly proposition.
In the twilight of the nuclear era, we can look back
at the historical events which lead to the development of this industry.
The generation of nuclear electricity is an unfortunate footnote to the
development of nuclear weapons. In the post Chernobyl era, society is becoming
much more aware of the risks and costs of this technological dinosaur.
The public relations efforts necessary to insure popular support for technology
based upon government subsidies and a ritual of evasion of waste disposal
and decommissioning costs are no longer sufficient to counter the obvious
safety hazards and the looming deficits of this technology. The sales to
waste production ratio for MYAPC and other nuclear power plants is $20
in revenues for every curie of spent fuel wastes generated. All nuclear
power plants generate nuclear wastes at the rate of about 1,000 curies
per hour of operation for a typical 800-900 megawatt facility. No country
has yet come up with a safe solution for disposing of these spent fuel
wastes including the construction and actual implementation of a final
safe permanent geological repository. The propensity of certain countries
(England, France, Japan, Germany, etc.) to reprocess spent fuel is an unsatisfactory
solution that only results in the production of additional huge quantities
of radioactive waste and the creation and proliferation of even more fissile
material (plutonium). The legacy of the generation of nuclear power, assuming
there are no further catastrophic nuclear accidents, is thus:
The legacy of MYAPC as a bioregional source point of anthropogenic
radioactivity and of hundreds of other commercial source points throughout
the world, is that of a massive drain on the scarce public resources of
the future for the purpose of paying for the short-sighted and mercenary
activities of the past. Only the potential threat of a terrorist vaporizing
a nuclear power plant for political or sectarian reasons surpasses the
certainty of the huge waste storage and disposal obligations of the future
as the most ominous legacy of the twilight of the nuclear era.
1. The long term economic burden of the safe storage or
disposal of these wastes will be a legacy of the twentieth century for
generations to come. Due to both cost and political considerations, the
prospect of final disposal of radioactive wastes in a geological repository
is probably a chimera. The more realistic alternative is monitored retrievable
portable stored waste. This option is a safer but also a much more expensive
alternative to the uncontained release of radioactive waste in geological
formations as has been the past practice in the United States and which
continues to be the policy in all other countries with a nuclear generating
2. A second component of this legacy is the long term
burden of insuring that the nuclear generation of electricity, in itself
essentially a small nuclear accident occurring over a long release duration
at each generating station, doesn't evolve into a larger Chernobyl type
accident. Society may succeed at containing the radioactivity at each nuclear
power station and limiting the effluents to a few curies of biologically
significant radionuclides, but only at a huge cost to future generations.
3. The third component of the nuclear energy pyramid is
the long term burden of management of reactor grade plutonium. The presence
of substantial quantities of 239Pu (1/2 T = 24,240 yr.) in MYAPC
spent fuel means this material must be the subject of extensive security
precautions for thousands of years. These costly security precautions must
ensure that this plutonium is not available to persons or governments who
would extract it for weapons production purposes, or utilize the spent
fuel in a raw form as a component of terrorist or nuclear blackmail activities.
The recent glare of publicity on the deficiencies and
inadequacies of existing nuclear power plant safety systems and the urgent
necessity for their immediate and costly repair and upgrading only exacerbates
the economic pressures which are now undermining the viability of nuclear
energy. The decommissioning waste inventories, scenarios and plant site
use options of the future are unpleasant components of the economic unraveling
of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme in Maine.
|B. DECOMMISSIONING WASTE
The following is an approximate estimate of Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company radioactive wastes at shutdown (2008); it is these
wastes that are our site-specific legacy to the generations who will follow
us in Maine: 1
|Pre-decommissioning Low-level Waste: Stage I (to 2008)
|Decommissioning-derived Low-level Waste: Stage II
|GTCCW: in Reactor Vessel: (2010*)
|HLW: Spent Fuel: (2008)
|Short-lived nuclides at shutdown: (2008)
|Montsweag Bay: (2008)**
|Terrestrial environment: (2008)
*After two years of cooling
**The actual nuclide inventory of Montsweag Bay is difficult to characterize
due to the unknown impact of the leaky fuel cladding in the early years
of MYAPC operation, which may have resulted in substantially more liquid
effluent releases than MYAPC documentation notes. Another anomaly in regard
to MYAPC environmental monitoring occurred in 1978 when W.J. McCarthy was
monitoring radionuclide concentrations in Maine Yankee seaweed. At the
time he was taking samples from Montsweag Bay, a Chinese nuclear test explosion
was noted and several weeks later McCarthy observed substantial contamination
in Montsweag Bay sea vegetables resulting from this test. MYAPC's radiological
surveillance, the laboratory analysis of which was done by the Yankee Atomic
Electric Company (See whistleblower's letter
in the previous sub-section of this part of RADNET), was unable to observe
either the radioiodine contamination pulse or the barium 140, lanthanum
140 and ruthenium 103 that McCarthy observed. The following table summarizes
the discrepancies in McCarthy's vs. MYAPC's surveillance.
***The recent startup of a Tennessee nuclear power station (TVA) slightly
lowers this estimate, which is derived from dividing the projected spent
fuel inventory in 2008 by the number of light water reactors (LWR).
1This table adapted from Brack (1993), pg.
Comparison of McCarthy et al.' s and MYAPC Data2
||318.3 dry weight
||1,176 dry weight
||73 wet weight
||226.8 dry weight
||711.3 dry weight
||111 wet weight
||131.8 dry weight
||5,150 dry weight
||13,330 dry weight
||39.49 dry weight
||4,649 dry weight
||73 wet weight
||2,061 dry weight
||44.39 dry weight
||9,823 dry weight
2Adapted from Brack (1986), pg. 25.
3Highest in Montsweag Bay report.
4Highest range in annual report; seaweed
species not specified.
5LLD: Contamination below the lower
limit of detection.
SPENT FUEL DECAY TIME
The DOE Integrated DataBase indicates weapons production
high-level waste has a total radioactivity and thermal power decrease of
2-4% per year "within storage units to which no new waste has been added"
(IDB, pg. 46). Pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel contains approximately
20,000,000 curies per metric ton of heavy metal (spent fuel), decaying
to about 1,000 Ci per metric ton after 1,000 years (IDB, pg. 28). The probable
impact of the MYAPC as an accident-in-progress is not the health physics
impact of this spent fuel, but the economic and social costs of ensuring
safe storage and disposal of these wastes. MYAPC: Please don't spill your
250 tons of spent fuel.
|C. DECOMMISSIONING SCENARIOS
NRC rules for decommissioning nuclear facilities allow
three possible methods for plant deconstruction and waste storage and removal.
The prompt removal (within six to eight years) of all
plant equipment and radioactive wastes and the return of the plant site
to unrestricted use. The 1987 TLG report which estimated prompt decommissioning
costs at $187,000,000 is now completely obsolete. Total decommissioning
costs using the DECON scenario would exceed $2,000,000,000 and would include:
The failure of the DOE to build and operate a final repository
for civilian spent fuel, which would be paid for by the federal government
from funds collected by utility rate payers (referred to as the "mill rate"),**
effectively and efficiently shifts long-term spent fuel storage costs back
to the ratepayers who are the alleged beneficiaries of the nuclear energy
pyramid scheme. The Utopian vision of the Yucca Mountain disposal facility
is no longer viable, and, with only slightly more than $100,000,000 collected
from MYAPC customers toward such an elaborate decommissioning scenario,
it is extremely unlikely that either the federal government or utility
ratepayers will ever have the funds to completely decommission Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company. The recent attempt to utilize the spent fuel mill
rate waste disposal fund, as articulated in the 1996 and 1997 nuclear waste
policy acts, to fund the temporary storage of commercial spent fuel at
a proposed Nevada Test Site Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility
is one more act in the radioactive waste disposal soap opera. Passage of
this revised nuclear waste policy act, which would let NRC licensees off
the hook with respect to funding spent fuel storage and transportation
costs prior to the arrival of these wastes at a final geological repository,
failed in 1996 and has been shelved in 1997 as result of Clinton administration
opposition. The failure to agree on, construct and finance a geological
repository at Yucca Mountain is the key component ensuring the likelihood
that MYAPC spent fuel will remain at Wiscasset indefinitely.
The removal of contaminated plant low-level waste components
and their disposal in a Texas low-level waste repository: $400,000,000+.
The removal of uncontaminated or very slightly contaminated
plant equipment and debris to an unknown location and the return of the
site to unrestricted use: $100,000,000+/-.
General decommissioning costs, including staff termination
and administrative costs: $500,000,000+.
The removal of GTCC reactor vessel wastes and their packaging
within a multiple purpose canister (MPC*) system and their transport to
an unknown location: $100,000,000+.
The removal of spent fuel and its packaging within a multiple
purpose canister system (MPC*) and its temporary containment in a monitored
retrievable storage site (MRS) prior to a final disposal at Yucca Mountain
including temporary maintenance of the existing spent fuel pool, extensive
ongoing administrative costs, and MRS site preparation obligations: $200,000,000+.
Final disposal of spent fuel at Yucca Mountain including
site evaluation, construction and administrative costs for at least fifty
*The multiple purpose canister (MPC) system includes
canisters for the spent fuel, storage casks, transportation casks and disposal
casks for the spent fuel canisters, horizontal storage facilities for monitored
retrievable storage (MRS) and specially designed rail and transport vehicles.
**Not to be confused with the general decommissioning
fund for MYAPC, which now stands at $125,000,000.
SAFESTOR is the decommissioning technique recommended
by the most recent TLG report, which now estimates decommissioning costs
at $316,622,600. The SAFESTOR scenario involves long-term on site mothballing
of MYAPC until the always elusive final high-level waste repository at
Yucca Mountain is available. SAFESTOR implies a final dismantling at some
future date; all costs are either postponed or exacerbated. The only advantage
to SAFESTOR is the political convenience of delaying the inevitable decommissioning
shortfall for collection by future generations.
MYAPC DECOMMISSIONING CONUNDRUM
The Hanford Reservation in Washington state has a January,
1, 1995, inventory of 348,000,000 Ci of contained high-level waste and
total site life cycle remediation cost estimate of 75 billion dollars,
reduced to 50 billion dollars in 1996 due to budget cutbacks. The Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory has an inventory of 51.6 million Ci of
contained high-level waste and total site life cycle remediation cost estimate
of 30 billion dollars, reduced to 19 billion dollars in 1996 due to budget
cutbacks. The MYAPC inventory of contained spent fuel wastes at 10 years
cooling is approximately 200 million Ci. No mention is made by NRC or
state of Maine officials of any "site life cycle remediation cost estimates."
THE MYAPC PYRAMID SCHEME: NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY @ 2.7
CENTS PER KILOWATT HOUR AND ... ?
The one decommissioning option never mentioned by the
NRC and the licensee, entombment is the likely decommissioning scenario
of the future due to the high costs and political difficulties of off-site
waste disposal. This option is clearly defined in NRC regulations. Recent
NRC rule changes allow transfer of oversight responsibilities for "decommissioned
reactors" to a committee of concerned citizens, e.g. environmentalists.
Environmental radiation levels must be maintained at 15 µR-1.
Establishment of an ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation)
at the time of decommissioning is permitted by the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy
Act which includes a lengthy passage defining ISFSI regulations. One of
many possible decommissioning scenarios would allow the Lincoln County
Planning Commission, as administrator of both in-state and out-of-state
vendor sponsored reactor and spent fuel wastes, to supplement the Wiscasset
ISFSI costs with revenue enhancement from storing additional spent fuel
generated courtesy of the South Korean Lightwater Reactor Agreement (Dec.
1995). The South Koreans are just one of many foreign and domestic waste
generators seeking ISFS facilities within the U.S. as a result of waste
disposal obligations inherent in both domestic and foreign DOE contract
arrangements. If this seems a remote possibility, consider the 28 tons
of foreign spent fuel now returning to the Savannah River Plant for reprocessing
as a component of DOE contract agreements which are being observed.
These DOE contract-derived wastes are just the tip of the iceberg of nuclear
wastes looking for temporary storage facilities or waiting for reprocessing.
If Maine's newly elected independent governor would be faithful to his
devotion to favoring the interests of the most predatory commercial activities
in a world of Darwinian corporate struggle-for-survival, why would the
defacto high-level waste dump at Wiscasset not be expanded to meet
the challenge of servicing the nuclear industry the state government so
enthusiastically adulates? Monitored retrievable storage of foreign spent
fuel has the potential to be an extremely lucrative business, and the MYAPC
site has a very convenient location adjacent to an accessible deep water
bay. Aerial surveillance reveals two excellent near-site locations for
an ISFS facility near Wiscasset: Chewonki Neck and the "north-side parcel,"
either or both of which would provide a convenient location for a semi-permanent
or permanent well-landscaped sculpture garden of interesting dry cask storage
containers of one design or another. Under any conditions, the likely scenario
for MYAPC generated spent fuel is not monitored retrievable storage in
Nevada as proposed by current legislation proposed in Congress (Feb. 1997).
When it comes to nuclear waste, what looks great on paper is usually extremely
difficult to implement for political and economic reasons. The more likely
scenario is the devolution of waste storage responsibilities to the local
level; this is both more consistent with current government deregulation
efforts and also much cheaper to fund. The town of Wiscasset is not only
a principal beneficiary of the generation of nuclear electricity, but the
likely location of MYAPC ratepayer entitlements, i.e. spent fuel waste.
The tip off that MYAPC derived spent fuel will be difficult to move is
the current failure not only to fund, design and construct the multipurpose
canister system necessary to move the fuel, but to publicly discuss the
issue and the many relevant unfunded decommissioning obligations. In Maine,
the denial mechanisms of a predatory state government have been very effective
at postponing the day of reckoning. Recent developments at MYAPC clearly
indicate that the sophisticated public relations efforts essential to the
continued operation of MYAPC pyramid scheme (public relations - the governor's
greatest forte) are grossly inadequate to postpone the twilight of the
nuclear era in Maine.
Recent budget cutbacks at the OCRWM (Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management) have resulted in the termination of the DOE
program for designing a modern multipurpose canister system. The MPC system
was to be used at all nuclear facilities for on-site monitored retrievable
storage of spent fuel, or its transport to either a temporary or permanent
repository. Any NRC licensee seeking to utilize MPC technology in the future
will have to obtain this equipment from the private sector. The lack of
a uniform design and the involvement of for-profit corporations in the
future design and construction of this equipment will result in greatly
increased costs for utilities choosing to use this technology. The rationalization
for the termination of this program may be that there is no sense in wasting
tax dollars if there is no certain destiny for spent fuel (e.g. Yucca Mountain).
One immediate effect of the cancellation of the MPC program is to promote
reliance on the much more primitive dry cask technology for spent fuel
storage. This older technology utilizes cement casks which are not portable
and have a much more limited life expectancy than the modern MPC system;
use of dry casks implies the spent fuel will not be going anywhere. Dry
cask storage has one advantage over an MPC system: it is much less expensive.
This is one more component of the collapse of the nuclear energy pyramid
That the Attorney General of Maine and the Maine Public
Utility Commission instigate legal action to establish an escrow account
for the decommissioning of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, including
the funding of radioactive waste storage and disposal costs, and that this
escrow account be funded, prior to any ratepayer contributions, by the
stockholders and sponsors of the MYAPC up to the full value of their equity
in and proportionate ownership of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.
MYAPC Proposition Update - 5/18/97
In view of the recent decision by the owners of MYAPC
to sell their nuclear generating facility in Wiscassett, the above proposition,
first published in Legacy for Our Children in 1993, is revised as
That any and all proceeds from the sale of the Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC) be set aside in an escrow account for
the purpose of payment of unfunded radioactive waste storage, disposal
and decommissioning costs incurred by the construction and operation of
this facility, and that this escrow account function as a supplement to
the existing MYAPC decomissioning fund and the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (NWPA) mill-rate fund for final deep geologic disposal.
That, as noted above, these costs be funded, prior
to any rate payer contribution, by the stockholders and sponsors of the
MYAPC up to the full value of their equity in and proportionate ownership
of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, and that this escrow account
function as a supplement to the existing decommisssioning fund and the
1982 NWPA mill-rate fund.
That no proceeds from the sale of the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company be applied to any stranded costs other then
those pertaining to unfunded radioactive waste storage, disposal and decommisssioning
costs, including the purchase and use of a multipurpose canister (MPC)
system to establish on site spent fuel storage as the first stage of an
integrated high level waste management system.
That in the event the collection of these three funds
(escrow, decommissioning, mill-rate) is insufficient to pay for waste storage,
disposal and decomissioning funding, that the original owners of the MYAPC
assume responsibility for these unfunded costs, prior to any rate payer
contributions up to the full value of profits derived from the generation
of nuclear wastes at this facility since 1972.
|D. ECONOMIC ISSUES BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brack, H.G. (Ed.). (1993). Legacy
for our children: The unfunded costs of decommissioning the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Station. Pennywheel Press, Hulls Cove, ME.
Environmental Protection Agency. (1982). Draft environmental
impact statement: Environmental standards for management and disposal of
spent nuclear fuel, high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes.
Report No. 520/1-82-025. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C.
This report describes the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
as a model for the dilemmas of dismantling any nuclear power facility.
This report reproduces the MYAPC reactor vessel nuclide
inventory which was included in the 1987 TLG Decommissioning Study for
the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, and then reprinted in Vanags
(1992, A Study in Radioactive Wastes). This data, essential in evaluating
the efficacy of NRC decommissioning alternatives, is otherwise not available
from the NRC or the licensee.
This report also contains approximate estimates of the
unfunded decommissioning costs pertaining to MYAPC which are in excess
Jackson, Shirley A. (April 29, 1997). Testimony
April 29, 1997, Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to the House Commerce Committee, Energy and Power Subcommittee
concerning high-level waste legislation. Federal Document Clearing
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. (1992). Spent fuel
storage at Maine Yankee. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Augusta,
"We believe the provision in H.R. 1270 for centralized interim storage
of spent fuel has several positive features. Continued at-reactor storage,
for an interim period, would protect public health and safety. However,
a centralized interim storage facility, when compared to dispersed storage
at more than 75 sites throughout the country, would allow for a more focused
inspection and surveillance program by both the Department of Energy and
the NRC. In addition, such a facility would save valuable inspection resources
for permanently shut-down facilities..."
"Indefinite storage in an above-ground facility is inconsistent with
the Commission's Waste Confidence decision ... The Commission ... strongly
supports including in H.R. 1270 deep geologic disposal as an essential
element of an integrated system. The Commission continues to believe that
deep geologic disposal is a sound and technically feasible solution to
the problem of final disposition of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level
"... the NRC can maintain its technical capabilities for licensing deep
geologic disposal contingent on adequate funding for the NRC high-level
"The NRC is concerned that the overall schedule which provides for the
Department of Energy's acceptance of high-level nuclear waste for interim
storage no later than January 31, 2000, and its submission of the license
application for the permanent repository no later than December 31, 2002,
sets these programs on a collision course with respect to a need for resources,
if adequate funding is not provided for both of these fundamental elements
of the integrated high-level nuclear waste management system."
"We agree with provisions in H.R. 1270 which revoke the Department of
Energy's repository siting guidelines. ... Further, the bill should make
clear that amendments to the Commission's regulations to implement the
Act shall not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement
or an environmental review under NEPA."
"Timely NRC review of a potential repository license application will
depend on, among other things, receipt of a high-quality license application
from the Department of Energy, as well as on sufficient NRC resources to
maintain its independent technical review capability."
Chair Jackson also expressed concern that H.R. 1270 "would require the
Commission to license phase one facilities within 16 months of receipt
of an application." Jackson expressed (the optimistic) view that "2 to
3 years may be necessary."
This testimony references ongoing and in fact growing concern with decommissioning
and waste storage disposal funding shortfalls. The DOE's most recent estimate
of the cost of construction and implementation of the Yucca Mountain geological
repository is $26,550,000,000 excluding defense and West Valley high-level
waste disposal. Under the ideal circumstance that reactor performance will
not be affected by aging, the DOE estimates that this amount is sufficient
to implement the geological repository (DOE/RW-0490,
October 1996: see the review of this citation in this section of RADNET).
The editor of RADNET respectfully submits the opinion that life cycle costs
for siting all commercial spent fuel including extensive administrative
costs not included in DOE estimates, but excluding multi-purpose canister
costs included in the 1996 DOE report but recently cut by Congress, are
now approaching 100 billion dollars for 109 nuclear power plants.
Chair Jackson references but does not specify that the construction
and implementation of an interim off-site monitored retrievable storage
facility in Nevada as a component of the integrated high-level nuclear
waste management system will add an additional cost of at least 100 million
dollars to the final total cost.
Jackson also neglects to mention that resumption of the multiple purpose
canister program essential to the efficient and safe storage of spent fuel
or transportation to any location will cost approximately 65 to 75 million
dollars per power plant for the canisters themselves, with tens of millions
of dollars in additional administrative, transportation, legal and insurance
costs necessary to get the MPC's to the interim storage site in Nevada.
Total system life cycle costs for the integrated high-level nuclear
waste management system including deep geological disposal in 1997 dollars
are at least one billion dollars per NRC licensed nuclear facility. The
testimony of chair Jackson before the House Commerce Committee, Energy
and Power Subcommittee references this conundrum without being cost specific.
The rapidly increasing costs of low-level, GTCC and high-level waste management
as well as the growing costs of plant decommissioning and NRC mandated
safety upgrades are simply not matched by a likely availability of sufficient
federal funds (as well as ratepayers contributions) to finance the utopian
vision of a happy ending to the nuclear energy debacle.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. (1993). Maine Yankee:
A potential site for low-level radioactive waste storage or disposal.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Augusta, ME.
This brief report provides an interesting glimpse into
some of the assumptions underlying the nuclear waste scam at the MYAPC.
The five year (1987-1991) average cost of MYAPC's electricity
is given as 2.9 cents a kilowatt hour... "without the electricity from
MYAPC, electricity consumers in Maine would spend 65-100 million dollars
more for electricity." (pg. 1).
This data is followed by the information that under federal
law disposal of high-level waste (spent fuel) "is the responsibility of
the federal government whereas low-level waste disposal is a state responsibility
" (pg. 1).
Nowhere in this report is it mentioned that, in fact,
the federal government accepts responsibility for spent fuel disposal only
upon its receipt at a final geological repository and only if such a repository
is available. Otherwise, all storage, maintenance, packaging, transportation
and temporary monitored retrievable storage costs for spent fuel are the
responsibility of MYAPC ratepayers as the principle beneficiaries of the
generation of electricity derived from this facility.
This report discusses spent fuel storage options, of which
re-racking was the choice that has been implemented since its publication.
No mention is made of the myriad problems associated with
long-term storage of spent fuel in an environment that was not designed
for this purpose.
This publication discusses licensee hopes for an off site
low-level waste disposal scenario in preference to on site low-level waste
Malestskos, C.J. (1989). Radioactivities in the cycle
of a potential low-level radioactive waste repository in Maine: A report
to the Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority. Maine Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Authority, Augusta, ME.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (1992). Integrated data
base for 1992: U.S. spent fuel and radioactive waste inventories, projections
and characteristics. Technical Report DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 8. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN.
This report, which discusses the relatively small amounts
of operational low-level wastes originating from MYAPC, is significant
in that it is a symbol of state and licensee focus on the least significant
component of waste production at MYAPC. No mention is made of decommissioning
derived low-level wastes, reactor vessel GTCC wastes or spent fuel wastes,
all of which must be funded for storage and disposal by ratepayer collections
which have yet to be instituted on any significant level.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (1995). Integrated data
base report 1994: U.S. spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste inventories,
projection and characteristics. Report No. DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 11. Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN.
This data base (1982 edition) was first reviewed by the
Center for Biological Monitoring (Brack, 1986), and provides the inventories
of spent fuel in lightwater reactors in the United States used throughout
TLG Engineering, Inc. (1987). Decommissioning study
for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. No place of publication
See RAD 11-5: United
States Military Source Points for an extensive discussion of the significance
of high-level waste and spent fuel inventories contained in this most recent
issue of this data base.
TLG Engineering, Inc. (1993). Decommissioning cost
study for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. No place of publication
This is the first of the decommissioning reports which
estimated decommissioning costs at MYAPC at $167,000,000 and resulted in
the 1994 report by the Center for Biological Monitoring on the decommissioning
deficit at MYAPC which has yet to be funded.
This link will show you a printable scan of the reactor
vessel inventory page from this report.
Our comments on this
report can be found in the Decommissioning Debacle section.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1988). General
requirements of the nuclear regulatory commission for decommissioning nuclear
facilities. Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
This is the most recent decommissioning report and contains
an estimate of $316,000,000 for the DECON scenario, with a slightly higher
estimate for the SAFESTOR alternative.
This report contains the first discussion of the possibility
that decommissioning MYAPC may be delayed due to a lack of a site for disposing
of spent fuel wastes.
"It is currently anticipated that MYAPC will need to provide
for extended storage and caretaking of the spent fuel inventory until such
time that off site disposal becomes an option." (pg. 15).
This latest TLG report is contained within the Amendment
to FPC Rate Schedule No. 1, Vol. 1 (United States of America before
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company,
Docket No. ER94-___; Jan. 18, 1994).
Vanags, U. (1992). A study of radioactive wastes.
Maine State Planning Office, Augusta, ME.
These requirements are explicit and specify that radioactive
wastes must be funded for their storage and disposal at the time they are
This is the source of the NRC decommissioning scenarios
which include DECON, SAFESTOR (the current decommissioning plan for MYAPC
as designated in the latest TLG decommissioning report), and the one option
never mentioned but the most likely future scenario, ENTOMBMENT.
These general requirements are the subject for a special
Center for Biological Monitoring report to the Office of the Attorney General,
State of Maine; the NRC has failed to observe or enforce its own decommissioning
requirements. To order a full copy of this CBM report, see RAD 16-2: Publications
This report pertains to the radionuclide inventories which
will result from the decommissioning of MYAPC. The primary focus of this
report is on the 129,000 curies of low-level waste which will be generated
by the deconstruction of this facility (See the revised edition of this
report; the first edition of this report contained incorrect data).
The estimate of the burial volume of low-level waste is
given as 443,939 ft3; this estimate has since been sharply lowered
due to developments in compaction technology, as noted in the second TLG
This report reprints information about the MYAPC reactor
vessel and components, including greater than class C (GTCC) waste inventories
of over 4,000,000 Ci, which cannot be sited in the Texas compact low-level
waste repository now under construction.
See Brack (1994) for an extensive discussion of the contents
of this report. The Center for Biological Monitoring report which contains
this discussion can be ordered, for information go to RAD 16:
At the time of publication, this report represented a
step in the direction of freedom of information (FOI) about nuclear waste,
as appendix 4 was the first listing of reactor vessel components and wastes
of an NRC sponsored reactor that this editor has seen. Following this slip-up,
security has been tightened and no subsequent licensee generated radioactive
waste information (TLG was the subcontractor providing the decommissioning
study) has appeared in any state of Maine reports. In fact, such reports
have been discontinued under the administration of an Independent governor
who this editor sees as an integral contributor to the predatory milieu
of evasion of nuclear waste funding and power up-rate scams at MYAPC.
Recent safety evaluations by the Maine Nuclear Safety
Advisor indicate that aging steam generators subject to multiple micro-degradation
mechanisms, when resleeved with state of the art technology are of equal
or superior safety to new steam generators. However, only a small component
of the aging parent tubes have been repaired, giving rise to radical differences
in service life expectancy. This raises the question as to whether Mr.
Vanags is still the State Nuclear Safety Advisor, or has his job description
been changed to that of public relations advocate for the licensee, MYAPC?
The failure to admit the priority of licensee economic
interests over the safety evaluations of aging steam generators and other
equipment or note the multiplicity of safety and design flaws revealed
by recent NRC inspections, combined with the enthusiastic support of the
Maine state government for the nuclear energy waste pyramid scheme, suggests
that the office of Maine Nuclear Safety Advisor (SNSA) is an unlikely source
of accurate nuclear safety information, now, or in any time in the future.
As the MYAPC nears the end of its operational activities, the reactionary
role of the SNSA in recent safety controversies effectively renders this
office as an obsolete but symbolic component of the collapse of the nuclear
energy pyramid scheme.
Two fundamental groups of legal issues confront the
MYAPC and its sponsors, supporters, and ratepayers in the twilight of the
nuclear era, a twilight which the MYAPC both characterizes and nourishes.
The most pressing and obvious legal issues pertain to the questions raised
by the whistleblower's letter, investigated by the NRC, and now pending
before the office of the U.S. Attorney for Maine, U.S. Dept. of Justice:
did MYAPC and YAEC (and possibly some officials at the NRC) deliberately
and fraudulently manipulate computer data for the purposes of misrepresenting
the capacities of the emergency core cooling system and the reactor vessel
containment for the purpose of obtaining (three) illegal power up-rates?
These power up-rates resulted in a windfall to the corporate sponsors of
MYAPC of +/-100 million dollars. To what extent did MYAPC and YAEC employees
violate NRC regulations, federal laws, or engage in a conspiracy for the
purpose of profit? To put the question in a slightly different way, did
these employees and corporate sponsors engage in a pattern of criminal
activity which would justify prosecution under U.S. Code Title 18 Sections
1961-1968 (Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act)? Most
of the following citations and reports deal with this first group of legal
The second fundamental legal issue confronting the
MYAPC and its sponsors, supporters and ratepayers also relates to violation
of NRC regulations and federal law. The 1981 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and
the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning
nuclear facilities (Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988) clearly mandate
funding nuclear waste storage, transportation and disposal costs at the
time of the generation of the radioactive wastes. Who is responsible for
the failure to comply with these federal regulations? Why does the NRC,
as well as the federal government not enforce its own regulations and laws?
Who was responsible for this failure and who profits as a result of this
enforcement failure? What is the relationship between this group of legal
issues and the huge profits which result from this funding failure, and
the first group of legal issues pertaining to falsification of computed
data and the huge profits that derived from these illegal activities? A
second component of the legal issues arising from the failure to fund the
storage and disposal of MYAPC radioactive wastes relates to the role of
the State of Maine and its long-time support of the evasion of these inevitable
costs. What role has the offices of Governor, Public (corruption) Advocate,
State Planning Office, Human Services and State Nuclear Safety Advisor
played in the evasion of these costs, and what is their responsibility
for the huge waste disposal and decommissioning deficits, the future payment
of which is the legal obligation of Maine's electrical utility ratepayers?
The following citations and reports pertain to either one or both of these
groups of legal issues.
|B. LEGAL ISSUES BIBLIOGRAPHY
Center for Biological Monitoring. (1993). The failure
to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station: A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act
and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning
nuclear facilities. Fed Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988. Prepared for
the Office of Attorney General, Augusta, Maine.
Center for Biological Monitoring. (October, 1994).
Yankee Atomic Power Company non-compliance update, re: The failure to fund
nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station:
a commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the
general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning
nuclear facilities. Prepared for the Office of Attorney General, Augusta,
Maine. Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988.
This is the first in a series of reports prepared by the
Center for Biological Monitoring pertaining to the violations of federal
law with respect to funding radioactive waste storage and disposal costs.
This report was also sent to the U.S. Dept. of Justice. Both the State
Attorney General and the U.S. Dept. of Justice apparently disposed of all
CBM reports in the nearest circular file.
This report is available upon request in writing from
the Center for Biological Monitoring.
Sellman, M. (March 8, 1997). An open letter to the
citizens of Maine: Maine Yankee. Bangor Daily News, Bangor, ME. [Mike
Sellman is the President of Maine Yankee.]
This report was prepared specifically for the U.S. Dept.
of Justice following a Sept. 11, 1993, complaint about irregularities in
the operation and oversight of the MYAPC.
This report applies the contents of the previous complaint
to specific defendants: MYAPC, NRC, FERC, USDOE, and certain officials
of the State of Maine, and includes a total of 31 complaints pertaining
to the failure to fund nuclear wastes storage and disposal costs.
This report is available upon request in writing from
the Center for Biological Monitoring.
The seven principles of administering (the collapse of the) MYAPC (nuclear
waste pyramid scheme):
... and hope this will be sufficient to offset the dangers and risks
of an aging nuclear power station.
Too many dikes, not enough fingers.
Silkman, R. (1987). The effects of a mandatory early
shutdown of Maine Yankee, Maine State Planning Office. Maine State
Planning Office, Augusta, ME.
"Instill personal ownership/accountability in each employee"
"Ensure staff competence"
"Maintain equipment in top shape"
"Run effective, safe, short outages"
U. S. Department of Energy. (September, 1995). Analysis
of the total system life cycle cost for the Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management Program. DOE/RW-0479. U.S. DOE, Washington, D.C.
This report contains an important point about federal
preemption "which in some critical areas removes state officials from direct
jurisdiction over or perhaps even knowledge of safety matters" (pg. 30).
A frightening example of state complicity in the traffic
in nuclear waste.
This report notes that a mandatory early shut down of
MYAPC will result in the necessity of MYAPC ratepayers and Maine taxpayers
reimbursing MYAPC owners 1.2 billion dollars in compensation for lost investment.
This report conveniently fails to note that MYAPC generates
1 curie of high-level waste for every $20 in electricity sales and that
unfunded decommissioning and waste storage and transportation costs are
in excess of the 1.2 billion dollars which would be necessary to pay the
MYAPC owners in case of a mandatory early shutdown of the MYAPC nuclear
waste pyramid scheme.
U. S. Department of Energy.
(October 1996). Nuclear waste fund fee adequacy: An assessment.
DOE/RW-0490. U.S. DOE, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,
"The purpose of this report is to present the Departments analysis of
the adequacy of the 1.0 mil per kWh fee being paid by the nuclear utilities
for the permanent disposal of their SNF [spent nuclear fuel]." (pg. 1).
"The evaluation of fee adequacy is based on the principle of 'full cost
recovery' set forth in section 302 of the NWPA [Nuclear Waste Policy Act],
under which all costs related to the waste disposal services will be paid
for by the owners and generators of SNF and civilian and defense high-level
radioactive waste." (pg. 5).
"It is assumed in this projection that commercial units will operate
for 40 years from the issuance of their operating licenses without extensions,
reactor performance will not be affected by aging, and the equilibrium-cycle
capacity factor will increase slightly from 74 percent in 1995 through
2014 to between 75 and 76 percent until 2034. The operable nuclear capacity
has currently peaked at 100.3 gigawatts (GW) and is projected to gradually
decrease to 62.2 GW in 2015 and reach zero in 2035. ... Cumulative discharge
of civilian spent fuel is estimated to be about 84,000 metric tons of uranium
(MTU) SNF." (pg. 5-6).
"If the disposal fee remains unchanged at 1.0 mil per kWh of electricity
generated and sold, the cumulative fee revenues will be equivalent to $19.4
billion in 1994 dollars, comprised of annual disposal fees, on-time fees,
and interest accrued on deferred one-time fees. Annual disposal fee payments
total $15.4 billion (in 1994 dollars) from FY 1983 to FY 2034 ($9.4 billion
for FY 1995 through FY 2034) under the no-new-orders scenario." (pg. 7).
"The utilities originally owed approximately $2.3 billion in year of
expenditure dollars in one-time fees to the NWF [Nuclear Waste Fund] for
the disposal of the waste generated prior to April 7, 1983. At the end
of FY 1994, $1.5B of principal and interest had been paid, and $880M of
principal remains deferred and is accruing interest at the 13 week T-bill
rate." (pg. 7).
"Interest on unexpended NWF balances provides revenue in addition to
the fees and interest on deferred one-time payments discussed above. NWF
balances are invested by the Secretary of the Treasury in obligations of
the United States with maturities appropriate to the needs of the program."
"Estimated total system life-cycle costs are organized into seven major
categories: (1) Development and Evaluation, (2) Repository, (3) Transportation,
(4) Multi-Purpose Canister, (5) Waste Acceptance, (6) Benefits, and (7)
Payments Equivalent to Taxes (PETT). ... Program costs are expected to
peak in 2009 and gradually decrease until 2071, with a cumulative total
of $33,096 million of which the civilian portion is $26,550 million. Also
in Table 1 (see below) are the defense and West Valley share allocations
of estimated total system cost." (pg. 7-8).
U. S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney, District
of Maine. (March 14, 1997). Information. Cirm. No. 97-(18 U.S.C.
§1905). United States District Court, Portland, Maine.
Table 1. Summary of Civilian, Defense, and West Valley Allocations
of the Total System Life Cycle costs (1)
(in Millions of 1994 Dollars)
|Development & Evaluation
(1) Based on Analysis of Total System Life Cycle Costs,
September 1995 (Reference 6)
(2) Based on the Federal Register, Volume 52, Number
161, pp 31508-31524, August 20, 1987.
(3) Totals may not add due to rounding.
United States of America v. Edouard H. Trottier
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (January
3, 1996). Confirmatory order suspending authority for and limiting power
operation and containment pressure (effective immediately) and demand for
information (TAC No. M94194). Docket No. 50-309; License No. DPR-36;
EA-96003. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C.
The United States Attorney Charges:
On or about September 20, 1996, in the District of Maine, the defendant,
EDOUARD H. TROTTIER
an officer and employee of the United States and of a department
and agency thereof, to wit, a Project Manager in the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
('NRC'), published, divulged, disclosed and made known in a manner and
to an extent not authorized by law, information coming to him in the course
of his employment and official duties and by reason of an examination and
investigation made by and a report and record made to and filed with the
NRC, which information concerned and related to, among other things, the
identity of persons; to wit, defendant
EDOUARD H. TROTTIER
transmitted to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ('Maine Yankee'),
a subject of an NRC Office of Investigations ('OI') investigation concerning
the alleged deliberate failure of Maine Yankee to comply with NRC requirements
regarding the adequacy of Maine Yankee's emergency core cooling system,
portions of a confidential OI Investigative Report which contained the
allegations and conclusions of the NRC investigation and the identities
of certain individuals with information who had been identified in that
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1905.
Dated: March 13, 1997
Donald E. Clark
Assistant U.S. Attorney
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (May 8, 1996).
of the Inspector General event inquiry: NRC staff's actions related to
regulation at Maine Yankee (Case No. 96-04S). United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C.
This is the NRC order that limited power operation to
2,400 megawatts which resulted from a preliminary investigation of a whistle
blower's allegations of fraudulent manipulation of computer data for the
purpose of operating at a higher power level (2,700 megawatts).
"....that Yankee Atomic Electric Company and the Licensee
(MYAPC) knowingly performed inadequate analyses of the emergency core cooling
systems (ECCS) and the containment to support two license amendments to
increase the rated thermal power at which Maine Yankee may operate. It
is further alleged that the licensee deliberately misrepresented the analyses
to the NRC in seeking the license amendments. Specifically, it is alleged
that YAEC management knew that the ECCS for Maine Yankee, if evaluated
in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 using the RELAP5YA code, did not
meet the licensing requirements for either the 2630 MWt or 2700 MWt power
up-rates that had previously been granted, and that deliberate misrepresentations
were made to the NRC in order to obtain the 2700 Mwt power up-rate." (pg.
"It is also alleged that the licensee had applied for
power up-rates on the basis of a fraudulent containment analysis. Specifically,
the facility containment was designed for a pressure of 55 psig, but allegedly,
YAEC deliberately excluded an energy source (steam generators) from the
calculations to conceal the possibility that containment pressure could
increase beyond the design pressure during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)."
Also see Brief to the U.S. Attorney,
Jay McCloskey, Dec. 13, 1995 and Summary Notice
for a Petition for Indictment.
This report can be reviewed at the NRC Public Document
Room at the Wiscasset Public Library or ordered from the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, Docket No. 50-309, TAC No. M94194.
United States Senate. (January 21, 1997). S. 104: A
bill: To amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. 105th Congress,
1st Session, introduced by Murkowski et. al.
This is the second of a three part investigation of allegations
of manipulation of computer data in regard to "inadequate small break loss-of-coolant
accident (SBLOCA) analyses of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
to support two license amendments to increase the rated thermal power at
which Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station could operate." (pg. 3).
"Specifically, it was alleged that YAEC management knew
that the ECCS for Maine Yankee, if evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR
Section 50.46 using the RELAP5YA code, did not meet the licensing requirements
for either the 2630 Mwt or the 2700 Mwt power up-rates that had previously
been granted and that deliberate misrepresentations were made to the NRC
in order to obtain the 2700 Mwt power up-rate. It was further alleged that
MYAPC was cognizant of these inadequate analyses, yet misrepresented them
to the NRC in seeking the license amendments.... It was also alleged that
MYAPC applied for power up-rates on the basis of a fraudulent containment
analysis." (pg. 3).
This report explores the details of NRC staff activities
(See pg. 13-19) and the role they played in assisting the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Co. and the YAEC in obtaining these illegal power up-rates
by failing to observe and implement NRC regulations issued after the Three
Mile Island accident. This report focuses on the role of the NRC Maine
Yankee Project Manager in failing to oversee the implementation of plant
specific analysis and its submission to the NRC as a component of upgraded
safety evaluation reports (SER), as well as other NRC staff oversight failures
which contributed to the ability of the MYAPC and the YAEC to circumvent
This report has been issued by NRC Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) and can be viewed in the NRC Public Document Room at the
Wiscasset Public Library or ordered from the Office of the Inspector General
(Case No. 9604S).
"AUTHORIZATION.--The Secretary shall design, construct, and operate
a facility for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste at the interim storage facility site." (pg. 27).
"Within 18 months of a determination by the President that the Yucca
Mountain site is unsuitable for development as a repository under subparagraph
(B), the President shall designate a site for the construction of an interim
storage facility. If the President does not designate a site for the construction
of an interim storage facility, or the construction of an interim storage
facility at the designated site is not approved by law within 24 months
of the President's determination that the Yucca Mountain site is not suitable
for development as a repository, the Secretary shall begin construction
of an interim storage facility at the interim storage facility site as
defined in section 2(19) of this Act." (pg. 29).
"The Secretary shall consent to an amendment to the contracts to provide
for reimbursement to contract holders for transportable storage systems
purchased by contract holders if the Secretary determines that it is cost
effective to use such transportable storage systems as part of the integrated
management system, provided that the Secretary shall not be required to
expend any funds to modify contract holders' storage or transport systems
or to seek additional regulatory approvals in order to use such systems."
"The interim storage facility licensed in the first phase shall have
a capacity of not more than 15,000 MTU." (pg. 31).
"GUIDELINES.--The guidelines promulgated by the Secretary and published
at 10 CFR part 960 are annulled and revoked and the Secretary shall make
no assumptions or conclusions about the licensability of the Yucca Mountain
site as a repository by reference to such guidelines." (pg. 39).
"PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION.--In administering the Integrated Management
System, the Secretary shall, to the maximum extent possible, utilize, employ,
procure and contract with, the private sector to fulfill the Secretary's
obligations and requirements under this Act." (pg. 13).
"ONE-TIME FEE.--For spent nuclear fuel or solidified high-level radioactive
waste derived from spent nuclear fuel, which fuel was used to generate
electricity in a civilian nuclear power reactor prior to January 7, 1983,
the fee shall be in an amount equivalent to an average charge of 1.0 mill
per kilowatt-hour for electricity generated by such spent nuclear fuel,
or such solidified high-level waste derived therefrom. Payment of such
one-time fee prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1997 shall satisfy the obligation imposed under this paragraph.
Any one-time fee paid and collected subsequent to the date of enactment
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 pursuant to the contracts, including
any interest due pursuant to such contracts, shall be paid to the Nuclear
Waste Fund no later than September 30, 2002." (pg. 61).
"The person paying the fee under this paragraph to the Secretary shall
have no further financial obligation to the Federal Government for the
long-term storage and permanent disposal of spent fuel or high-level radioactive
waste derived from spent nuclear fuel used to generate electricity in a
civilian power reactor prior to January 7, 1983. (pg. 61-62).
"APPROPRIATION REQUEST.--In addition to any request for an appropriation
from the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Secretary shall request annual appropriations
from general revenues in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of the management
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from atomic energy
defense activities and spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors,
as established under subsection (a)." (pg. 69).
S. 104 overrides the environmental assessment clause of the National
Environmental Policy Act, depletes as well as terminates the 1982 Nuclear
Waste Fund (the mill rate fund referenced above), and completely eliminates
utility financial liability for spent fuel storage and disposal costs.
S. 104 is the attempt of the nuclear waste industry to effect a massive
transfer of financial responsibility from the local level (ratepayers)
to the federal level. Federal taxpayers, including those in states without
"benefit" of the "entitlements" from nuclear energy generation, would bear
the entire burden of spent fuel disposal costs of the future - a very liberal
S. 104, to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, another chapter
in the nuclear waste soap opera, provides the obscene spectacle of conservative
Republicans from nuclear energy producing states uniting in an unethical
attempt to relieve nuclear waste generators of spent fuel storage and disposal
responsibilities for the purpose of insuring the continuation of the nuclear
waste pyramid scheme. In all probability, the "monitored retrievable" spent
fuel disposal site in the Nevada desert would evolve into a permanent defacto
spent fuel disposal area since the termination of the Nuclear Waste Fund
established in 1982 would insure that insufficient funds would be available
to construct a permanent geological repository in the future.
It is extremely unlikely that S. 104 could ever be implemented were
it to be approved by the House of Representatives and were a presidential
veto to be overridden by both houses of congress. The recent termination
of the multi-purpose canister (MPC) by the Department of Energy is one
of several tip-offs indicating the difficulty of actually implementing
C. Brief to the United States Attorney
for Maine Jay McCloskey (Dec. 15, 1995), pertaining to a request for an
investigation of these falsifications and misrepresentations.
December 13, 1995
The Citizens of Maine
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
The Yankee Atomic Electric Company
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
A Petition to Jay McCloskey, United States Attorney for
Maine, requesting the investigation and prosecution of various criminal
acts which have had and will have an injurious effect on the constitutional
rights and the public safety of the citizens of Maine.
An expansion of the original complaint to the Department
of Justice, 1993. NRC Docket No. 50-309 (File RI-91-A-0154).
Prepared by the Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
for the United States Attorney for Maine and the Maine Attorney General.
Criminal activities requiring the immediate
attention of the Department of Justice,
the United States Attorney for Maine,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Attorney
General for the State of Maine
1. The doctoring of computer calculations at the Yankee
Atomic Electric Company for the purpose of illegally increasing the Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Company power level ratings.
In effect, a conspiracy to profit from the illegal
additional generation of nuclear electricity via criminal acts which include
the violation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and federal
2. The criminal misrepresentation of the emergency
core cooling system capabilities at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
nuclear reactor by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company.
In effect, the felonious manipulation of data for the
purpose of profiting from an illegal activity which violates NRC regulation
and federal law.
3. The falsification of data pertaining to the maximum
permissible reactor vessel containment pressure ratings at the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company.
In effect, a conspiracy to profit from illegal activities
which are a violation of NRC regulations and federal law, and which could
have a catastrophic impact on public safety in Maine.
4. The creation of a clear and present danger to the
public safety from an inaccurately rated emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.
In effect, increasing the risk to the public safety
of a serious nuclear accident resulting from for-profit criminal activities
which are a violation of NRC regulations and federal law.
5. The creation of a clear and present danger to the
public safety by the return to service of unsafe, corroded, and dilapidated
steam generators at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.
In effect, a conspiracy to profit from a clear breech
of duty potentially injurious to the public safety in lieu of replacement
of the dilapidated steam generators with new equipment.
6. The failure to fund the timely collection of radioactive
waste storage, transportation, and disposal costs at the Maine Yankee Atomic
In effect, the unconstitutional denial of due process
manifested in compulsory future payment of radioactive waste storage, transportation,
and disposal costs by Maine citizens who are not the beneficiaries of the
generation of these wastes.
7. The failure to maintain an adequate environmental
and biological monitoring database in the vicinity of the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company's nuclear reactor.
In effect, a breech of duty to maintain a sufficient
database for interpreting the health effects and environmental impact of
normal reactor operations, a nuclear accident, decommissioning, or to allow
a return of the facility to unrestricted use after decommissioning.
8. The failure to upgrade current emergency planning
in view of the increased risks of ECCS failure, steam tube rupture, and/or
reactor vessel failure from embrittlement and/or over pressurization at
the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.
In effect, a gross breech of duty with the potential
for widespread injurious effect to the public safety in the State of Maine.
In general, two categories of criminal activities are
the subject of this petition to the U.S. Attorney for Maine and to the
Attorney General of the State of Maine.
A variety of criminal activities can now be documented
pertaining to the proposed return to service of the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company nuclear reactor. Recent revelations (see reference 1) regarding
the plant power ratings, emergency core cooling system (ECCS), and the
reactor vessel containment capabilities illuminate a pattern of criminal
activity going back over a decade in time. The controversy over the generic
non-compliance with NRC regulations and federal law goes back to the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982. All the activities described in this brief are
now of immediate interest as a threat to the public safety and the public
finance in Maine at this critical moment of reactor restart.
For-profit criminal acts consisting of fraudulent manipulation
and misrepresentation of data essential to the licensing requirements of
the NRC and to the safe operation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's
The negligent and generic non-compliance of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
with existing federal law and the NRC's own regulations allowing systemic
victimization of unwitting Maine citizens due to the unconstitutional deferral
of the collection of radioactive waste storage, transportation, and disposal
No right of federal preemption gives the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the right to
abridge the constitutional rights of the citizens of Maine by their negligent
oversight of the duty to regulate nuclear waste, or their failure to prohibit
criminal activity which endangers the public safety by jeopardizing the
safe operation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's nuclear reactor
(or any nuclear reactor) or which victimizes the citizens of Maine (or
a conspiracy to profit from the criminal avoidance of
NRC licensing and safety regulations through the extraordinary falsification
and misrepresentation of data essential to the safe operation of the Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Company emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the
reactor vessel containment structure
a conspiracy to profit from the clear and present danger
posed by the return of damaged and corroded steam generators to service
as well as inadequacies in the ECCS and the reactor vessel containment
structure at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company nuclear reactor
a conspiracy to profit from the unconstitutional denial
of due process to the citizens of Maine by the failure to collect sufficient
funds to pay for the storage, transportation, and disposal of Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company's radioactive waste and the illegal redistribution
of these funds as profits for the owners of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
and their beneficiaries such as Maine Public Broadcasting Network
the negligent oversight of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Company by the NRC and FERC, which permit a pattern of for-profit interstate
criminal activity to occur which affects the public safety in Maine and
in other states with similar nuclear electricity generating facilities.
Prosecution of those who illegally profit from the
criminal avoidance of NRC licensing requirements, violation of federal
laws, the creation of public safety hazards, and the negligent collection
of radioactive waste storage, transportation or disposal costs should be
undertaken in accordance with U.S. Code Title 18 Sections 1961-1968 (Racketeering
Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act) as well as any other violations
of the U.S. Code which the Department of Justice sees fit to prosecute.
The United States Attorney for Maine is requested to
join with the Maine Attorney General and seek assistance from the Department
of Justice and begin an aggressive investigation of these criminal activities
as soon as possible.
Submitted to Jay McCloskey, U.S. Attorney for Maine,
Wednesday December 13, 1995 by H.G. Brack, Director, Center for Biological
This petition is also submitted to Andrew Ketterer,
Attorney General for the State of Maine, requesting that he join with the
United States Attorney for Maine and seek assistance from the Department
of Justice in facilitating prosecution of the criminal acts described in
this brief. The Attorney General for the State of Maine is also requested
to take immediate action to prevent the reopening of the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company nuclear reactor.
BIBLIOGRAPHY, REFERENCES &EVIDENCE:
The following documents should be incorporated into the
official record and evidence by their mention herein.
Anonymous letter delivered to the Union of Concerned Scientists
at the end of November 1995 and provided to Mr. Uldis Vanags, Maine State
Nuclear Safety Advisor. 3 pp.
Brack, H.G. (ed.). 1986. "A review of radiological surveillance
reports of waste effluents in marine pathways at the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company at Wiscasset, Maine 1970-1984. An annotated bibliography."
Center for Biological Monitoring. Pennywheel Press. Hulls Cove, ME 62 pp.
Brack, H.G. (ed.). 1993. Legacy for our children: the
unfunded costs of decommissioning the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.
Center for Biological Monitoring. Pennywheel Press. Hulls Cove ME 134 pp.
Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. No date. "The failure
to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station: A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act
and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning
nuclear facilities." Hulls Cove, ME 6 pp.
Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. October 1994. "Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Company Non-compliance Update, Re: The failure to fund
nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station:
A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the
general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning
nuclear facilities." Hulls Cove, ME 6 pp.
Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. September 1995.
"A Summary of Safety Concerns Re: Maine Yankee-NRC Meeting of September
14, 1995 Steam Generator Sleeving Update." Hulls Cove, ME 16 pp.
Douglas, John. May/June 1995. "Solutions for steam generators."
EPRI Journal. May/June: 29-35.
General Requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities. Federal Register 53-24015 to 24055,
Maine Yankee Power Uprate Application, December 1988.
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
RELAP5Y, A computer program for light water reactor system
thermal-hydraulic analysis" YAEC 1300P
United States Code Title 18 Sections 1961-1968, Racketeering
Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act
D. Request for an Investigation
by the FBI, Posted on December 29, 1995, regarding the ongoing fraud and
malfeasance at Maine Yankee.
This letter to Louis J. Freeh, Director of Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Tenth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington,
D.C. 20505 dated December 27, 1995 is restricted information.
A copy of this letter may be obtained from the Center for Biological Monitoring
by submitting a written request for a copy with an explanation of why it
would be of interest to you (Box 144, Hulls Cove, ME 04644).
E. A Letter to Shirley
Jackson, Chair of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, posted
on January 9, 1996
Shirley Ann Jackson
Chair of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
January 5, 1996
Dear Chair Jackson:
In regard to the allegations of the criminal falsification
of data at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the resulting illegal
power up-rate I have the following questions:
Do you intend to seek an impartial (e.g. independent
of any ongoing NRC inquiry) investigation of the indictable offenses which
have been noted in the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company up-rate scam which
includes egregious alterations of documents pertaining to the emergency
core cooling system, et cetera?
If you don't wish to seek an outside
investigation of the Maine Yankee allegations (e.g. FBI), why not?
Do you intend to seek the assistance of independent council
(see 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 591 et seq.) in the investigation of probable NRC
involvement in the up-rate scam, including an investigation of the possibility
of NRC knowledge of illegal up-rates at other nuclear facilities?
Do you believe criminal and/or civil litigation against
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the Yankee Atomic Electric Company
under Title 18 Section 1961-1968 (Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations
Act) is justified by the patterns of behavior which have occurred in execution
of, or by the substantial financially gains (+/-$100 million) which resulted
from, this illegal power up-rate?
Would you kindly provide a written reply, for the public
record in Maine, of your responses to these inquiries?
Director, Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-00012
February 29, 1996
Mr. H. G. Brack, Director
Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
P. O. Box 144
Hulls Cove, Maine 04644
Dear Mr. Brack:
I am responding to your letter dated January 5, 1996, regarding the
allegation that Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), acting as agent
for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo), knowingly performed inadequate
analyses to support two license amendments to increase the rated thermal
power at which Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station may operate and that MYAPCo
was cognizant of these inadequate analyses, yet misrepresented them to
the NRC in seeking the license amendments, which were subsequently granted.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission received the allegation on December 4,
With respect to the issue of inadequate analyses, the NRC conducted
a technical review and evaluation of the circumstances and records surrounding
the license amendments to increase the station's rated thermal power. Based
on the results of that review and on a transcribed public meeting held
with MYAPCo on December 18, 1995, at our headquarters here in Rockville,
Maryland, the NRC staff determined that the computer code used by Maine
Yankee to demonstrate, in part, compliance with our emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) requirements has not been applied in a manner conforming
to NRC requirements. Accordingly, the staff considers it unacceptable for
the plant to operate at its currently-licensed maximum, thermal power rating
of 2700 MWt.
The NRC staff issued a Confirmatory Order and Demand for Information
on January 3, 1996, which detail these findings and order station power
reduced to 2440 MWt (about 90% of 2700 MWt). The Demand for Information
required that MYAPCo, before restarting the plant, complete additional
reviews and technical evaluations in support of operating Maine Yankee
at 2440 MWt and provide the results to NRC under oath of affirmation. After
the information required by the Demand for Information was received by
the NRC, MYAPCo restarted the plant on January 11, 1996. Our on-site Resident
Inspectors report that the plant is operating satisfactorily at 2440 MWt
as of this date.
On January 23 through 25, 1996, an NRC inspection was conducted at
the plant and at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The inspectors, accompanied
by observers from the State of Maine, reviewed MYAPCo's additional technical
evaluations and material supporting operation at 2440 MWt. All conditions
for plant restart were verified satisfactory with no outstanding technical
The NRC staff plans to hold a public meeting near Maine Yankee to
discuss the results of its technical reviews and inspections. This meeting
is being planned for March, but we will publish the date, time, and location
of the meeting in the local media as soon as it is scheduled.
In response to your questions about investigation of MYAPCo's allegedly
misrepresenting information to NRC in seeking license amendments, NRC's
Office of Investigations is responsible for investigating false statements
made to the NRC, either by licensees or contractors and investigating the
allegations of wrongdoing against Maine Yankee and YAEC. The Office of
Investigations coordinates with other investigative agencies and refers
investigative findings that indicate criminal wrongdoing to the Department
of Justice and FBI for further investigation and possible criminal prosecution,
as appropriate. Consequently, the NRC would not refer the Maine Yankee
and YAEC allegations for an outside investigation until the current OI
investigation is completed, and then only as warranted by the investigative
For the same reasons, we are not seeking the assistance of independent
counsel in the investigation of allegations of irregularities in NRC's
approval of the power uprate for the Maine Yankee plant. The procedures
governing the appointment of an independent counsel are set forth in the
Ethics in Government Act at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599. The Act gives
the Attorney General authority to seek the appointment of an independent
counsel only when the conditions of the statute are met. The allegations
to which you refer do not satisfy these conditions. The NRC's independent
Office of the Inspector General, however, has jurisdiction over allegations
of malfeasance by NRC employees and is reviewing the Maine Yankee and YAEC
allegations, and any possible staff involvement.
Moreover, prosecution of violations of the Racketeering Influences
and Corrupt Organization Act are not within the purview of the NRC. As
I previously stated above, NRC's Office of Investigations will refer findings
of potential criminal wrongdoing to the Department of Justice and FBI for
further investigation and criminal prosecution, as appropriate.
If you need additional information or if you have any questions,
you may want to contact NRC's Project Manager for the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, Mr. Ed Trottier. Mr. Trottier can be reached by telephone
at (301) 415-1427.
Shirley Ann Jackson
F. Summary Notice for a Petition
for Indictment, posted on January 9, 1996
MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
Summary Notice for a Petition for Indictment
KEY WORD INDEX: badge of fraud, confidence
game, conspiracy, corpus delecti, crimen falsi, deceit, indictable offenses,
irreparable injury, malum in se, misprision of felony, moral turpitude,
necessary inference, piercing the corporate veil, probable cause, quid
pro quo, scienter, ultra hazardous activity, unjust enrichment, unconscionable,
vicarious liability, white collar crime
Failure to fund radioactive storage and disposal costs
at the time these wastes were generated is a violation of the 1982 Nuclear
Waste Policy Act and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.
Mandatory future payment of radioactive waste storage
and disposal costs by Maine citizens who did not benefit the nuclear generation
of electricity which created these wastes is a violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The return to service of corroded steam generators suffering
from multiple degradation mechanisms, in lieu of their replacement with
new equipment, is an act of criminal negligence.
The fraudulent alteration of computer data and emergency
core cooling system and reactor vessel proficiency reports is a violation
of federal law and NRC license requirements.
The illegal power up-rate which resulted from these fraudulent
misrepresentations yielded +/- $100,000,000 in what may be the largest
case of fraud in the history of Maine.
The imminent return to service of the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company and the resumption of the production of 1,000 curies of high-level
waste per hour of operation is an illegal act and, in view of the deteriorated
condition of the Maine Yankee facilities, constitutes a reckless disregard
for public safety.
The above acts of malfeasance and negligence join to demonstrate
that the commercial activities of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
constitute clear evidence of a lucrative pattern of interstate criminal
activity which can and should be prosecuted under the civil and criminal
provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. sections 1961 et seq. (R.I.C.O.).
The failure to act by the attorney general and the governor
of Maine to protect Maine citizens from the predatory impact of these federally
sponsored activities constitutes both nonfeasance and a de facto obstruction
of the administration of justice.
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