Baxter, M.S., Aston, S.R. (1983). Deep-ocean radioactive waste disposal: An evaluation of the seaweed critical pathway. Health Physics. 45. pg. 139-144.

• "...36 of the 80 principal waste nuclides have seaweed eaters as their defined critical group." (p.139).

• "...Contamination is extremely localized with respect to the sources from which the waste is believed to originate." (p.33)
• "...Contaminated sediments from both dumpsites show evidence of the introduction of waste radioactivity below the sediment surface before subsequent redistribution by in-sediment processes." (p. 30)

Panel on Radioactivity in the Marine Environment. (1971). Summary of U.S. sea disposal operations, 1951-1967 (Atlantic Ocean). pg. 37.
 

Year	No. Containers, All Types	Estimated Activity at Time of Packaging (Ci)
1951-67	33,998	79,482.9

Panel on Radioactivity in the Marine Environment. (1971). Summary of U.S. sea disposal operations, 1946-1966 (Pacific Ocean). pg. 37.
 

Year	No. Containers, All Types	Estimated Activity at Time of Packaging (Ci)
1946-1966	52,530	14,677.3

• "Official" data.

• More "official" data, but is it accurate?

Little information is available about either Russian or U.S. military ocean dumping sites; Aarkrog, et al. (1993) lists the following inventories of liquid radioactive waste disposed of by the Russians:

Berents Sea: 450 TBq

White Sea: 3.7 TBq

Kara Sea: 315 TBq + 570 TBq of median and low-level waste

Far Eastern Seas: 456 TBq

Facts and Problems Related to Dumping of Radioactive Waste at Seas Washing the Territory of the Russian Federation. (October 24, 1992). Materials of the Report of the Governmental Commission for Questions Related to Dumping of Radioactive Waste at Sea. which was created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation. No. 613-RD. English translation, by Greenpeace Moscow, 140 pages, including additional supporting documents. $20.00.
 

9. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ACCIDENTS AND DUMP SITES

• A whole series of nuclear submarine accidents and waste disposal fiascoes have characterized Russian naval activities. In addition to the accidents documented in the following citations, an October 31st Jane's Information Group Limited foreign report documents 3 additional Soviet submarine accident sites where rockets or fuel could be extracted using underwater robots. The 3 previously unlisted locations are
• Bermuda: submarine rocket launcher K219: October 1986: 50 nuclear warheads: 5,500 meters. A recent report from the San Francisco Examiner (Nov. 24, 1996) indicates that the submarine contained 32 nuclear warheads containing 90 kg. of ²³⁹Pu broke open spilling an unknown quantity of plutonium. Subsequent news stories indicate that Charles Hollister and Hugh Livingston from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute will be joining with Russian researchers on an Oceanographic ship to survey the sunken sub with deep sea cameras, and to gather sea floor samples. The US Navy has refused the request for research funds and assistance for this project, the status and completion date of which is unknown.
• Bay of Biscay: nuclear power submarine K-8: c.1971: two reactors and 10 nuclear warheads: 4,000 meters.
• Hawaii: nuclear armed submarine K-109: 1968: "part of it's nuclear arsenal was removed by the CIA in operation Jennifer": 1968
• RADNET will post more information about these source points if any publications or research papers provide additional information: refer to RADNET Section 13, RADLINKS, Part 3-G, Jane's Resource Links.
• Also see the Kola file in this Section of RADNET Part 6, and check the Bellona website in RADNET Section 13, RADLINKS Part 2-B.

Aarkrog, A., Tsaturov, Y. and Polikarpov, G.G. (1993). Sources to environmental radioactive contamination in the former USSR. Roskilde, Denmark: Riso National Laboratory.
 

Kola Peninsula, 1989, Nuclear submarine accident	74 TBq
Kara Sea; six nuclear reactors with spent fuel and ten reactors without spent fuel	85 PBq
Vladavostak, Aug. 1985, submarine explosion and fire	185 PBq

• Aarkrog also notes the loss of 24 PBq in six Atlantic and Pacific submarine accidents, the last of which is the Komsomolet accident listed above.

• "IAEA is carrying out a 4 year International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP) that will comprehensively cover all aspects of radioactive dumping in the Arctic Seas and it will be reported to the London Convention in 1996. The IAEA-MEL study described here represents a preliminary contribution to IASAP." (p. 114)

• "... 16 naval reactors, from seven submarines and the icebreaker Lenin, were dumped at five sites in the Kara Sea, an arm of the Arctic Ocean located east of Novaya Zemlya. Each vessel had suffered a reactor accident." (p. 12)
• The number of reactors containing spent nuclear fuel was six plus 60% of the spent nuclear fuel from a seventh reactor.
• "At the time of disposal the reactors contained 17 to 66 kCi of actinides, 1.7 to 4.8 MCi of fission products, and 0.9 to 1.1 MCi of activation products in reactor components and primary system corrosion products." (p. 11)
• The total fission product activity was 2,300 kCi. (p. 12)

Sivintsev, Y. (1994). The seabed sources of radionuclides in the dumped reactor compartment of the atomic icebreaker, "Lenin". J. Environ. Radioactivity, 25, 3-10.

• "The radioactivity of all transuranium elements was estimated at about 3 kCi." (p. 8)
• "After 500 years, the largest source of radioactivity will be from ²³⁹Pu, ²⁴⁰Pu and ²⁴¹Am estimated at about 1 kCi." (p. 8)

• Three articles in this special issue are cited in this part of Section 11, and two others are cited elsewhere in Section 11.

• "The concentrations in sediments (0-10 cm) were in the range 120-910 Bq m^-2 for ¹³⁷Cs and 2.5-135 Bq m^-2 for ^239,240Pu."(p.99)
• The influence of radioactivity from dumped nuclear waste has not had a significant impact on the general levels of anthropogenic radioactivity." (p. 99)

The use of SNAP isotopic devices, also known as Radioisotope Thermal Generators (RTG), to power various satellite units as well as ocean based coast guard buoys and lighthouses has resulted in a number of accidents involving the dispersion of ²³⁸Pu (U.S. satellites), as well as uranium (Russian satellites) due to satellite orbital failure for one reason or another. The first and only well documented SNAP satellite (9A) failure occurred in 1964, when 16,000 Ci of ²³⁸Pu were dispersed in both the northern and southern hemispheres by a navy satellite that burned up upon reentry over the Indian Ocean. This accident has been well-documented in radiological surveillance literature, unlike other U.S. satellite failures, also, possibly containing ²³⁸Pu power sources, which have occurred since this date. Only limited information is available about Russian satellite failures. Three or more other functioning naval satellites are allegedly still orbiting with ²³⁸Pu power sources; a number of others have been aborted with the isotopic power source allegedly intact. The following data are reproduced from Panel on Radioactivity in the Marine Environment, (1971), pg. 33. Also see part 8 of this section for comments on radioisotopic power generators in marine environments.
 

System	Power output	Fuel form	Fuel quantity (kCi)	Aerospace application	Design mode of re-entry	Status (1968)
SNAP 8A	3 We	238Pu	1.6	Navy satellite	800 km orbit; burn-up on re-entry	2 launched 1961
SNAP 9A	3 We	238Pu	16	Navy satellite	960-km, 900-yr orbit; burn-up on re-entry	2 launched 1963 1 aborted 1964

The Cassini space probe has generated some Websites containing more information. Check out the Stop Cassini Earth Flyby Action Site and some Titan IV rocket explosion photos at the Space Online site.
 

RUSSIAN SATELLITE RE-ENTRY, NOVEMBER 17, 1996

The Reuters News Service reports that a stricken Russian Mars space probe containing four thermoelectric generators fueled by radioactive plutonium crashed into the Pacific Ocean between Easter Island and the Chilean capital of Santiago. Initial reports are that these generators contained only 200 gm of plutonium (238). Press reports that the canisters holding this plutonium are designed to withstand the heat and shock of re-entry may be unreliable. Additional information about this accident will be posted by RADNET as it becomes available.

A 12/17/96 story in the Christian Science Monitor indicates this satellite made re-entry over the Atacama Desert in northern Chile, rather than over the Pacific Ocean. An intensive search by Chilean authorities, Bolivian troops and presumably US intelligence authorities is under way in the hopes of recovering the encased cargo of 200 grams of plutonium intact. No news stories have appeared that RADNET is aware of since this date. Presumably, if the plutonium had been recovered intact, some type of public relations effort would result to emphasize the safety of the upcoming Cassini mission. In lieu of a public relations news byte on this topic, one may assume the plutonium vaporized upon re-entry. More information on this event would be greatly appreciated.

Bridges, Andrew. (December 21, 1998). NASA energy source blasted. The Daily News of Los Angeles, Valley Edition. pg. N4.

• "Anywhere from six to eight missions the Jet Propulsion Laboratory is planning for launch by 2015 will make use of plutonium 238 as an energy source, including one to the radioactive element's namesake, Pluto."
• Since 1961, NASA has launched 25 spacecraft carrying radioisotope thermoelectric generators, devices that convert heat produced by decaying plutonium into electricity.  The latest, the 1997 launch of Cassini, used a record 72 pounds of plutonium."
• "The plutonium used on space missions is pressed into ceramic pellets encased in a heat- and impact-resistant shield designed to survive intact in any re-entry through the Earth's atmosphere, Wahlquist said."
• "Of the 25 missions that used radioactive material, however, three did fail, sending the plutonium aboard back to Earth."

• A comprehensive review of the history of 26 unclassified RTG (radioisotope thermoelectric generators) for space missions from the point of view of national security RTG enthusiasts.
• It contains basic information about how RTGs work and includes some description of RTG safety improvements since the 1964 disaster that is hardly mentioned.
• Despite being pro-RTG, this is an important article on the history and development of this technology.

• The latest in a long series of exposés by an investigative reporter who also teaches journalism at the State University of New York/ College of Old Westbury, this article is a summary of US government and NASA (National Aeronautics Space Administration) plans for the proliferation of nuclear technology in space.
• The most controversial future use of nuclear power in space is an October 1997 planed launch of the Cassini probe to Saturn carrying 72.3 lb. of Pu 238 fuel; this will be the largest amount of plutonium ever used in space.
• "There have been 3 accidents out of the 24 known space missions involving nuclear power. The Soviet failure rate is even higher; 6 of their 39 missions failed." (pg. 61). Other than the 1978 Russian Cosmos accident and the 1964 US satellite accident, Grossman does not list the other accidents.
• In 1989 the Gallileo launch carried 49.25 lb. of plutonium on a mission to Jupiter; the 1990 Ulysses took 25 lb. on its orbit around the sun. (pg. 61). In the list of magazine articles which follow, Grossman provides a comprehensive summary of the known uses of nuclear power in space.
• Other uses of nuclear technology in space discussed in this article include the development of nuclear powered satellites to transmit high definition multichanneled television signals (Sandia National Laboratories); two plutonium fueled space probes for a mission to Pluto in 1999 (NASA); a plutonium powered heating system for the Mars Pathfinder scheduled for launch in December 1996 (NASA); and US Air Force plans to use nuclear reactors in space to provide power and propulsion for military satellites. (pg. 59).
• Also discussed in this article is the Air Force current ground testing of 6 Russian Topaz 2 nuclear reactors - originally purchased for use in the Strategic Defense Initiative or Starwars - for other space activities. (pg. 58).
• The following is a partial list of Grossman's many articles on nuclear power in space, mostly in alternative press sources:
• (July/August 1986). Red Tape And Radioactivity: How one simple question eventually revealed the government's secret agenda for the space program. Common Cause Magazine. pg. 24-27.
• (January 23, 1988). Plutonium Shuttle: The Space Probe's Lethal Cargo. The Nation.
• (October 1988). The Fire Next Time. Long Island Monthly.
• (October 2, 1989). Nuclear Slingshot. The Nation. pg. 336-337.
• (October 6-13, 1989). Space Bomb. Philadelphia City Paper. No. 269. pg. 1, 10-11.
• (October 17. 1989). Kiss Florida Good-bye? The New York Times.
• (October 11, 1989). Death threat from space. The Globe and Mail, Canada's National Newspaper. No. 43,635.
• (December 8, 1989). Nuking the Final Frontier. Pasadena Weekly.
• (August 15, 1990). Plutonium Skies. The San Francisco Bay Guardian pg. 23,25.
• (September 12, 1990). Jupiter probe poses deadly plutonium threat. Guardian. p. 8.
• (September 11, 1995). Apollo Outtakes. The Nation.

• A disturbing commentary on the gross incompetence of the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. intelligence community in estimating the location of the re-entry of the Russian Mars 96 space probe and the 299 gram payload of ²³⁸Pu used as a thermo-electric power source.
• The space probe crashed on the Bolivia-Chile border, not in the Pacific or in Australia as first estimated.
• The 200 grams of ²³⁸Pu have yet to be located. U.S. authorities misjudged the re-entry time by a full day, accidentally tracking space probe debris rather than the probe itself.
• The article contains additional commentary on the 1997 Cassini Mission containing 72.3 pounds of ²³⁸Pu.

• "On Monday, April 6th, 1997, NASA sent me, via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, a copy of the DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CASSINI MISSION (DSEIS) and an accompanying document called NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSES FOR CASSINI MISSION ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS." (pg. 1).
• "These two NASA documents are not good science. They are not even science. They are nothing more than a biased review of selected data, and very little real data is actually presented." (pg. 1).
• "I found my name on the back pages of the DSEIS, along with about 80 other individuals, 30 environmental, peace, and other groups, and about 30 Federal, state, and local government organizations. A quick look where my name appears might lead you to think (as it did some of my friends) that I endorse this DSEIS, or that I have at least been consulted. I have not been consulted and I do not endorse these documents!" (pg. 1).
• This 40 page critique may be downloaded in its entirety from the link given above -- a comprehensive set of comments on the stupidity of the NASA environmental impact statement.

• This accident occurred on April 21, 1964, over the Indian Ocean; 0.6 PBq ²³⁸Pu (16,000 Ci) was dispersed from this accident.
• 2/3 of the activity was deposited in the Southern Hemisphere.

• "²³⁸Pu/^239,240Pu activity ratios, usually about 0.04, rose suddenly to 25 in October 1982" The authors were unable to identify the origin of the abnormally high ratio.
• The source of this sudden increase in plutonium may be a satellite accident, or a leak in a secret French fuel reprocessing facility located north of Paris: Any information on this incident would be welcomed.

• "For an inadvertent reentry from a VVEJGA or VEEGA Earth swingby(s), the potential health effects could occur in two distinct populations, the population within and near the reentry footprint and most of the world population within broad north to south latitude bands. Since the reentry footprints, and hence the potentially affected populations, could vary considerably with reentry angle and latitude, the predictions of radiological exposures and health effects have large uncertainties." (pg. 4-76).
• "The total or overall mission risk (i.e., the expected number of health effects due to the risk of radiological accidents associated with the overall mission) is dominated by Earth swingby reentry accidents for both the primary launch opportunity (VVEJGA) and the backup launch opportunity (VEEGA). The overall mission risk (without de minimis) is 1.7 x 10^-3 for the primary launch opportunity, and for the backup is 1.8 x 10^-3." (pg. 4-76).
• "In the unlikely event that a VVEJGA or VEEGA inadvertent reentry occurred, approximately 5 billion of the estimated 7 or 8 billion world population at the time of the swingbys could receive 99 percent or more of the radiation exposure." (pg. 4-76).
• In Karl Grossman's article in CovertAction Quarterly (Summer, 1996), Risking the World: Nuclear Proliferation in Space, Ernest Sternglass is quoted from an interview in Nukes in Space, a video produced by Grossman: "NASA underestimates the cancer alone by about 2,000 to 4,000 times. Which means that not counting all the other causes of death -- infant mortality, heart disease, immune deficiency diseases and all that -- we're talking in the order of ten to twenty million extra deaths." (pg. 57). The wide discrepancies between the more liberal NASA health effect estimates (low) and the more conservative Sternglass estimates (high) typify the wide variations in the health physics impact estimations for all anthropogenic radioactivity source points. For the Cassini mission the threat is from only 72.3 lb. of ²³⁸Pu, but this plutonium will be dispersed as stratospheric fallout much more efficiently than uncontained releases at, below, or in the earth's surfaces and seawater.

• "NASA has used plutonium on 23 other spacecraft."

• The date of this accident was Jan. 1978, with reentry over the Northwest Territories of Canada.
• Reentry inventories: 3T Bq strontium-90; ¹³¹I: 0.2 Bq; ¹³⁷Cs: 3T Bq (81 curies).
• "75% of the original material is estimated to have remained in the upper atmosphere, and thus available for global distribution." (Aarkrog, A., Source terms and inventories of anthropogenic radionuclides, pg. 29).